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THE RELATIVELY INSOLVENT JOINT
TORTFEASOR AND THE GOOD FAITH
SETTLEMENT
Florrie Young Roberts*
I. INTRODUCTION
The good faith settlement is an important component of the overall
scheme of comparative negligence whereby liability for a plaintiff's loss is
apportioned among joint tortfeasors according to their degrees of fault.
By entering into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff, a joint
tortfeasor can free himself from liability to his joint tortfeasors for partial
indemnity on a comparative fault basis. The California Supreme Court
set forth new rules for good faith settlements in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Wood-
ward-Clyde & Associates.' Overruling a majority of appellate court deci-
sions on the subject,2 the supreme court redefined the term and held that
a settlement is in good faith only if the amount of the settlement is within
the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of
comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries.'
In establishing its reasonable range test for a good faith settlement,
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. A.B. 1971, Stanford
University; J.D. 1974, University of Southern California.
1. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
2. The following decisions held that the sole test for determining whether a settlement
was made in good faith was whether there was tortious or collusive conduct aimed at the
nonsettling tortfeasors between the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor(s). These cases were
expressly disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt: Burlington N.R.R. v.
Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc.
v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr.
256, 264 n.7 (1985); Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38
(1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7,
698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985); Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court,
122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-
Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7
(1985). Other cases that were impliedly disapproved insofar as they utilized or referred to the
disapproved test for good faith are: Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d
280, 212 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1985) (review granted on other grounds and opinion ordered citable);
Anderson v. International Harvester Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 100, 211 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1985)
(review denied and ordered depublished); Henderson v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 297,
208 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1984); Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr.
470 (1983); Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 671 (1983); Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
3. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
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the supreme court listed two factors which may prove to be the excep-
tions that almost swallow the rule. Those factors are the financial condi-
tion and insurance policy limits of the settling joint tortfeasor.4 The
court stated, "even where the claimant's damages are obviously great,
and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement fig-
ure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and unin-
sured, or underinsured joint tortfeasor."I Thus, under the Tech-Bilt test,
the financial resources of the settling tortfeasor are relevant to the issue
of the good faith of his settlement.
In fact, as a result of the Tech-Bilt case, financial condition may
prove to be the key factor in many good faith determinations. It is likely
that a tortfeasor wishing to settle will attempt to convince the trial judge
that his proposed settlement is in good faith because, given his financial
condition, it is reasonable in amount.' Or, perhaps a settling joint
tortfeasor will first attempt to convince a judge that his settlement is
within the "pure" reasonable range' of his proportional share of compar-
ative liability for the plaintiff's injuries. If his argument is unsuccessful,
he will then argue as a fallback position that the settlement is reasonable
because of his financial condition. Therefore, the financial condition of
the settling joint tortfeasor will in all likelihood be a factor in many good
faith settlement hearings.
Accordingly, an important issue facing a trial judge in applying the
Tech-Bilt reasonable range test is how to integrate the financial condition
and insurance status of a settling defendant into the formula for a good
faith settlement. This article offers guidelines to assist trial judges in ap-
plying the financial condition and insurance factors to the determination
of good faith. The method and the solution offered best accommodate
the policies underlying a good faith settlement.
4. Id.
5. Id. (citing Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843,
847-48 (1976)).
6. In one of the first appellate decisions after Tech-Bilt, the court looked to the financial
condition of the settling tortfeasor. "[A]t the time of the settlement, [defendant] had little or
no income and was going out of business, so all that he had to salvage was what he had
personally." Barth-Wittmore Ins. Co. v. H.R. Murphy Enters., Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 124,
134, 214 Cal. Rptr. 894, 899 (1985). See also Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 221
Cal. Rptr. 675 (1985), in which the appellate court upheld a trial court's finding of good faith
where "[t]he amounts in which they settled in no way reflects their culpability in the accident
.... However, balanced against these considerations is the overriding fact that the trial court
found the defendants were insolvent but for the insurance policies, a relevant factor." Id. at
1177, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99.
7. This article uses the term "pure" reasonable range test to refer to a test in which a
settlement is examined without reference to the settling tortfeasor's financial condition or in-
surance policy limits. See infra text accompanying notes 79-86.
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II. BACKGROUND
An understanding of the principles of comparative negligence, joint
and several liability, and partial indemnity is necessary in order to ana-
lyze the effect that a settling tortfeasor's state of relative insolvency8 has
on the issue of good faith. This section explains these concepts and dis-
cusses the components of a good faith settlement and how they fit into
the comparative fault system.9
A. The Good Faith Settlement in Context
The Comparative Fault Framework
In American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,' the Califor-
nia Supreme Court applied the rule of comparative negligence to multi-
tortfeasor situations. In doing so, it established that all tortfeasors re-
sponsible for plaintiff's injuries would be obligated to pay in accordance
with their percentages of fault."
1. Joint and several liability
An integral part of this comparative negligence system in both two
party 12 and multi-party 13 cases is the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity. 4 This doctrine mandates that each joint tortfeasor 5 is personally
liable for the total amount of the damages sustained by the plaintiff, even
though the independent negligent actions of a number of tortfeasors were
each a proximate cause of plaintiff's single injury. 6 As a result, the
8. The term "relative insolvency" is used to describe a tortfeasor who has insufficient
collectible assets to cover his allocable share of plaintiff's damages.
9. This "Background" section is taken in part from Roberts, The Financial Condition and
Insurance Policy Limits of a Joint Tortfeasor Wishing to Settle in Good Faith: Problems of
Discovery and Confidentiality, 26 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 63 (1986).
10. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
11. Id. at 608, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201. The American Motorcycle decision
was an extension of the court's prior decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), which established California's comparative negligence system
by replacing the doctrine of contributory negligence with a comparative negligence scheme in
two-party cases.
12. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 804, 532 P.2d at 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
13. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal.3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
14. Id. at 590-91, 578 P.2d at 906-07, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90.
15. The term "joint tortfeasor" applies both to tortfeasors acting in concert and to concur-
rent tortfeasors who, although acting independently, cause an indivisible injury. Turcon Con-
str., Inc., v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 282-83, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580, 581-82
(1983).
16. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 587, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187. Liabil-
ity attaches to a concurrent tortfeasor not because he is responsible for the acts of other in-
dependent tortfeasors who may also cause the injury, but because he is responsible for all
damage of which his own negligence was a proximate cause. Id. at 589, 578 P.2d at 905, 146
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plaintiff may recover the entire amount of his damages not attributable to
his own fault from any joint tortfeasor found liable, regardless of the
percentage of fault of that particular tortfeasor.' 7 From whom and in
what amounts he chooses to collect his judgment are completely within
the discretion of the plaintiff.
For example, if the jury awards plaintiff a $100,000 judgment
against co-defendants A and B, and finds defendant 4 10% at fault and
defendant B 90% at fault, the plaintiff may recover the entire $100,000
or any portion thereof from defendant 4, even though A 's proportionate
share of the liability is actually only $10,000.18 Defendant A could then
attempt to apportion the loss among himself and defendant B, 9 but this
would not concern the plaintiff who had already exercised the right to be
totally compensated from defendant A.
The purpose of the joint and several liability rule is to provide ade-
quate compensation for plaintiffs.2" This rule allows an injured plaintiff
to obtain full recovery for his injuries even when one of the responsible
parties does not have the financial resources to cover his liability.
21
Thus, the risk of one joint tortfeasor's inability to pay his share of the
damages is imposed on the remaining defendants, not on the plaintiff.
22
2. Partial indemnity
Although the court in American Motorcycle allowed a plaintiff to
collect the entire amount of his judgment from his choice of several negli-
gent defendants, the court opened an avenue of relief for the joint
Cal. Rptr. at 188. Therefore, even though principles of comparative negligence make it possi-
ble to assign some percentage figure to the relative culpability of one negligent defendant as
compared to another, this does not suggest that each defendant's negligence is not a proximate
cause of the entire indivisible injury. Id.
17. Id. at 587, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
18. Plaintiff could have chosen to sue only defendant A and then collect the entire judg-
ment from him, even though B was also at fault.
19. This apportionment would be accomplished by a suit for partial indemnity. See infra
text accompanying notes 23-28.
20. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189. The
alternative to the joint and several liability rule is the rule of several liability which would limit
a joint tortfeasor's liability to his allocable share of fault. In other words, in the above hypo-
thetical, this would mean that the plaintiff could collect only $ 10,000 from A and $90,000 from
B. The supreme court rejected this alternative in American Motorcycle principally because of
the "unwarranted dilatorious effect" it would have on the "practical ability of negligently in-
jured persons to receive adequate compensation for their injuries." Id.
21. Id. The supreme court referred to this as "one of the principal by-products of the joint
and several liability rule." Id.
22. Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort Liability
on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1464, 1483 (1979).
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tortfeasor who had been called upon to pay more than his proportionate
share of damages. He could pursue an action for partial indemnity
23
against his fellow tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.24 As the name
implies, the purpose of the action for partial indemnity is to allow an
equitable balancing of the books among those liable for the injury.
Through such a lawsuit, a joint tortfeasor who pays more than the
amount warranted by his percentage of negligence can obtain reim-
bursement from the other tortfeasors in proportion to the fault at-
tributable to each.2' This right may be asserted by a defendant against
any joint tortfeasor, whether named by the plaintiff in the original action
or not,26 and may be asserted either by cross-complaint27 or independent
action.28
As an example, consider the above hypothetical in which plaintiff
obtained full payment of his $100,000 judgment from defendant A who
was only 10% at fault. After such payment, A could assert a claim for
partial indemnity against B and could recover the amount of the judg-
ment that A paid in excess of A's percentage of fault. Accordingly, A
could recover $90,000 from B because B was 90% at fault. Thus, the net
result is that each tortfeasor pays an amount equivalent to his percentage
of fault.
3. The insolvent joint tortfeasor
Even though the insolvency of one joint tortfeasor will not alter the
plaintiff's recovery if the other tortfeasors have the assets to pay the en-
tire judgment, it does alter the amounts that ultimately will be borne by
the other joint tortfeasors. While they must initially pay all of plaintiff's
judgment, they will not be able to apportion the loss back to the insolvent
joint tortfeasor by a suit for partial indemnity because he will not have
assets upon which they can collect.
When one tortfeasor is relatively insolvent and two or more solvent
joint tortfeasors are involved, the share that should be borne by the rela-
23. The term "partial indemnity" is used in American Motorcycle and will be used in this
article. Other terms used to describe the same principle are "equitable indemnity" and "com-
parative indemnity."
24. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190. For a
more detailed discussion of the origins of the doctrine of partial indemnity, see Roberts, The
"Good Faith" Settlement: An Accommodation of Competing Goals, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 841,
846-51 (1984).
25. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
26. Id. at 606-07, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
27. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
28. E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, 21 Cal. 3d 497, 506, 579 P.2d 505, 510,
146 Cal. Rptr. 614, 619 (1978).
January 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:247
tively insolvent tortfeasor must be shared proportionately by the solvent
tortfeasors as though the insolvent person had not participated in the
action.29 In other words, the insolvent tortfeasor's shortfall is shared be-
tween the remaining joint tortfeasors in the ratio relative to their propor-
tionate fault.
For example, in Paradise Valley Hospital v. Schlossman,30 plaintiffs
brought a negligence action against a hospital and doctors A and B.
Plaintiffs were awarded $1.5 million by the jury and responsibility was
apportioned at 10% for the hospital, 50% for A and 40% for B. The
hospital paid $500,000 and B paid $1 million to satisfy the judgment. A
filed a petition for bankruptcy. The hospital then cross-complained for
partial indemnity against A and B, and B cross-complained against A for
partial indemnity. 31 Rejecting B's proposal that A's $750,000 shortfall
should be shared equally by the solvent defendants, the court held that
the shortfall must be shared by the solvent defendants according to their
relative proportionate fault. 32 The hospital and B were found liable in
the ratio of 1 to 4 (hospital 10%, B 40%, or 20% to 80%). Because A
was insolvent, the hospital should, therefore, ultimately bear 20% of the
total judgment and B should bear 80% of the total judgment. The hospi-
tal's share of the judgment was, therefore, 20% of $1.5 million, or
$300,000. Because the hospital had paid $500,000, it was entitled to a
$200,000 judgment against B on its cross-complaint.33
29. Bracket v. State, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1171, 1176, 226 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1986); Paradise
Valley Hosp. v. Schlossman, 143 Cal. App. 3d 87, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1983).
30. 143 Cal. App. 3d 87, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1983).
31. Id. at 89, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
32. Ild. at 93, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
33. Id. at 94, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 536. Because A was completely insolvent and contributed
nothing toward plaintiff's judgment, the court spoke of the solvent defendants being liable for
the total judgment in keeping with their 1 to 4 ratio of comparative liability when it computed
the actual amounts due from defendant B to the hospital. The court noted that the hospital's
share would be 20% of the total judgment of $1.5 million or $300,000. Since the hospital paid
$500,000, it was entitled to a money judgment against B for $200,000.
Another way of looking at this is to say that each solvent defendant is liable for the
shortfall of the insolvent defendant in proportion to his relative liability. This method achieves
the same result, and is the way the amounts must be calculated if the insolvent defendant is
able to contribute something towards plaintiff's judgment. In Paradise Valley the calculation
would go as follows: A's share of the judgment was 50% of $1.5 million or $750,000. He was
completely insolvent and was able to contribute nothing, so his shortfall was $750,000. The
solvent defendants should share that shortfall in the proportion of their comparative liability of
4 to I or 20% to 80%. Therefore, the hospital would be liable for 20% of the $750,000
shortfall, or $150,000. The hospital is also responsible for 10% of the $1.5 million judgment
because it was found 10% at fault. Adding these two amounts together, the hospital's share
should be $300,000. Since it paid $500,000, it is entitled to a judgment against B for $200,000.
For another example of a computation of the apportionment of a shortfall, see Bracket,
180 Cal. App. 3d at 1177 n.2, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 4 n.2.
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The same rule is applicable even when the plaintiff shares some of
the fault. To illustrate the point, let us alter somewhat the facts of Para-
dise Valley Hospital. Assume the plaintiff's damages were found to be
$1.5 million with the responsibility apportioned at 10% for the hospital,
40% for B, 25% for A and 25% for the plaintiff. Again, assume A is
insolvent. On these facts, plaintiff would be able to recover from either
solvent defendant 75% of $1.5 million or $1,125,000. The solvent de-
fendants would then share the shortfall of the insolvent defendant in di-
rect proportion to their respective fault, or in the ratio of 1 to 4. The
plaintiff, even though more at fault than the hospital defendant, would
not be required to participate in the shortfall.
3 4
B. The Good Faith Settlement
1. The ramifications of a finding of good faith
As mentioned earlier, the joint tortfeasor who has paid more than
his proportionate share of a plaintiff's injuries can reapportion the loss
among the other tortfeasors by a suit for partial indemnity. However,
the good faith settlement acts as a roadblock for the tortfeasor who at-
tempts to achieve this result. If one joint tortfeasor settles with the plain-
tiff prior to trial, and that settlement is found to be in good faith, the
other joint tortfeasors are prohibited from seeking partial indemnity from
the settling tortfeasor.35 Instead, the dollar amount of the settlement is
deducted from the amount the plaintiff may recover from the other joint
34. Paradise Valley, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 93, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
35. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West
Supp. 1986); American Motorcyle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 604, 578 P.2d 899,
915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 198-99 (1978). The California statutes providing for a good faith
settlement were specifically incorporated by the supreme court in American Motorcyle into the
context of partial indemnity. Id. at 599, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195. Section 877
provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or
not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or
more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort:
(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its terms
so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated
by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration
paid for it whichever is the greater; and
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for any
contribution to any other tortfeasors.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980). Section 877.6(c) provides: "A determination by
the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from
any further claims against the settling tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or
partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault."
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1986).
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tortfeasors,36 and the nonsettling joint tortfeasors must pay the balance
of the plaintiff's judgment without any right to partial indemnity from
the settling tortfeasor.
3 7
The facts set forth above provide an example. Assume again that
plaintiff suffered injuries entitling him to damages in the amount of
$100,000 from defendant A who was 10% at fault and defendant B who
was 90% at fault. Assume further that before trial defendant B settled
with the plaintiff for $5000. If that settlement is found to be in good
faith, the $5000 settlement would be subtracted from the amount that
plaintiff could recover from A. Under the rule of joint and several liabil-
ity, A would be required to pay the entire remaining $95,000 to the plain-
tiff. However, A would have no claim for partial indemnity to
redistribute the loss back to B. Therefore, even though A was only 10%
at fault, because of B's good faith settlement with the plaintiff, A would
end up paying $95,000, or 95% of plaintiff's judgment. B would escape
by paying only his settlement amount of $5000.
The calculation becomes more difficult when more than one nonset-
tding joint tortfeasor is involved. The appellate court in Lyly & Sons
Trucking Co. v. State3" decided this issue by analogizing the good faith
settlement situation to that of an insolvent tortfeasor.39 The court held
that the shortfall caused by a good faith settling joint tortfeasor must be
shared among the nonsettling joint tortfeasors in direct proportion to
their respective degrees of fault. This computation should be made as
though the settling tortfeasor had not been involved in the accident.40
This computation can be illustrated as follows. Assume that plain-
tiff suffered $100,000 in damages as a result of the actions of joint
tortfeasors A, B and C, and that A was 50% at fault, B was 40% at fault,
and C was 10% at fault. Assume further that before trial, plaintiff settled
with A for $40,000 and that at a pretrial hearing the court approved this
as a good faith settlement. Plaintiff then proceeded to trial against B and
36. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1986); American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at
603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
37. Usually the tortfeasors cross-complain against each other for partial indemnity in the
original action. When one tortfeasor settles and his settlement is determined to be in good
faith, he then files motions for summary judgment to dismiss the partial indemnity cross-com-
plaints against him. Ifa tortfeasor has been sued by another tortfeasor for partial indemnity in
a separate action, he will similarly file a motion for summary judgment to dismiss that action.
38. 147 Cal. App. 3d 353, 195 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1983).
39. The court cited and relied on Paradise Valley Hosp. v. Schlossman, 143 Cal. App. 3d
87, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1983). See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
40. Lyly & Sons Trucking Co. v. State, 147 Cal. App. 3d 353, 358, 195 Cal. Rptr. 116, 118
(1983). Following the rule ofLyly & Sons is Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1173-
74, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675, 695-96 (1985).
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C and obtained a judgment against both for $100,000.41 The amount of
A's good faith settlement would be subtracted from plaintiff's judgment
so that plaintiff could recover only $60,000 from B or C. Assume he
collected it from B. B could not redistribute any of the loss back to A
because A's good faith settlement released A from any claims for partial
indemnity. However B could maintain a suit for partial indemnity
against C.
The issue then becomes how to allocate ultimate responsibility as
between B and C. Under the Lyly & Sons rule, each must bear the loss
according to his respective percentage of fault. Because B was 40% at
fault and C was 10% at fault, their ratio of fault is 4 to 1 or 80% to 20%.
Therefore, they share liability for the $60,000 paid to the plaintiff accord-
ing to this same ratio. Therefore, B would be ultimately responsible for
80% of $60,000 or $48,000 and C would be ultimately responsible for
20% of $60,000 or $12,000. Thus, in B's suit for partial indemnity
against C, B is entitled to recover $12,000.42
As illustrated above, the shortfall caused by the good faith settle-
ment of one joint tortfeasor is allocated among the other joint tortfeasors
in the same manner as if the shortfall had been caused by the insolvency
of a joint tortfeasor. However, one important difference exists from the
standpoint of the nonsettling joint tortfeasors between a situation involv-
ing an insolvent defendant and a situation involving a defendant who has
settled in good faith. The difference lies in the finality of the allocation of
the shortfall. While remaining joint tortfeasors must initially make up
any shortfall caused by either the insolvency of another tortfeasor or that
tortfeasor's good faith settlement, the ultimate responsibility may vary.
In the case of an insolvent defendant, the tortfeasors who were initially
41. The same rules would apply if plaintiff sued only B or only C and then either B or C
paid a portion of the judgment that was greater than his allocable share.
42. Another way to perform the computation is to look at the shortfall caused by settling
defendant A. Under this method, one looks at plaintiff's total damage before subtraction of
the settlement amount and computes the percentage attributable to each defendant. On these
facts, $50,000 is attributable to defendant A, $40,000 is attributable to defendant B, and
$10,000 is attributable to defendant C. However, defendant A paid $40,000 in settlement and
has been released for claims for partial indemnity. Therefore, his shortfall is $10,000. Thus,
defendants B and C share that shortfall in relation to their percentage of fault, or in a ratio of 4
to 1 or 80% to 20%. Defendant B is therefore liable for $8000 of the shortfall and defendant C
is liable for $2000 of the shortfall. Accordingly, the total amount attributable to defendant B is
$48,000 ($40,000 attributable to his own percentage of fault and $8000 attributable to his
percentage of A's shortfall). Similarly, defendant C's total share is $12,000 ($10,000 attributa-
ble to his own percentage of fault and $2000 attributable to defendant A's shortfall). In his suit
for partial indemnity, B can recover $12,000 from C. No amount of the settling tortfeasor's
shortfall is redistributed back to a negligent plaintiff. Lyly & Sons, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 358,
195 Cal. Rptr. at 118-19.
January 1987]
256 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:247
forced to pay for that insolvent defendant's shortfall are able to obtain a
judgment against him which they can collect in the same way as any
other money judgment.43 Therefore, if the insolvent defendant later ac-
quires property, or is working, the solvent joint tortfeasors can recover
some or all of the sums they were required to pay by virtue of his
insolvency.
However, a good faith settlement achieves a permanent reallocation
of liability. A finding of good faith releases the settling joint tortfeasor
from any claims for partial indemnity.' Therefore, the nonsettling
tortfeasors must bear any shortfall caused by the good faith settlement
without any future recourse against the settling defendant.
In summary, whenever a prejudgment settlement by one joint
tortfeasor is found to be in good faith, the ultimate expense that must be
borne by each nonsettling joint tortfeasor is increased. Absent a settle-
ment, all defendants are liable in direct proportion to their respective
degrees of fault. By settling before judgment, one tortfeasor may dis-
charge his entire liability by contributing less than his proportionate
share, leaving the other joint tortfeasors saddled with the entire judgment
reduced only by the amount of the settlement.
Therefore, whenever a plaintiff attempts to enter into a good faith
settlement with fewer than all of the joint tortfeasors, the settling and
nonsettling tortfeasors are clearly adverse parties.45 As illustrated above,
this results from the fact that the lower the amount of the settlement, the
higher the amount that must ultimately be paid by the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors. The nonsettling tortfeasors, therefore, have a definite finan-
cial interest in whether the settlement is found to be in good faith and the
amount of that settlement.
2. The good faith settlement hearing
The issue of good faith is usually decided in a pretrial hearing pursu-
ant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.46 Section 877.6
allows a party to seek a court order approving the good faith of a settle-
ment or proposed settlement. The hearing is normally requested by a co-
defendant who wishes to settle with the plaintiff, although the plaintiff
sometimes is the moving party. Understandably, the defendant seeks this
43. See infra text accompanying notes 127-29.
44. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
45. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 44 (1981),
disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d
159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 267 n.7 (1985).
46. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986).
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determination for the assurance that if he settles, he will be totally free
from the litigation by being released not only from plaintiff's claims but
also from claims for partial indemnity by the other joint tortfeasors.47
Usually, the defendant conditions his final execution of the settlement
agreement on the court's determination that his proposed settlement is in
good faith and will not enter into the settlement absent this finding.
Without it, his settlement would not accomplish the desired purpose of
terminating his exposure because he would still be liable for partial
indemnity.
The nonsettling joint tortfeasors will object to the finding of good
faith if they believe the settlement is too low. The nonsettling co-defend-
ants do not want the settling defendant released from liability for partial
indemnity for a settlement price that is below the settling defendant's
"fair share" of proportionate liability for the plaintiff's harm because the
co-defendants are liable for the remaining amount of the plaintiff's dam-
ages without reimbursement from the settling defendant.
Section 877.6 specifically provides for the determination of good
faith at a pretrial hearing.48 In order that the issue can be resolved as
early in the litigation as possible, any petition for a writ of mandate to
review the trial court's decision receives expedited treatment.49 Other
portions of the statute provide that the hearing shall be held on at least
twenty days notice,50 that the hearing shall be held upon affidavits and
counteraffidavits, or that the court may receive evidence in its discre-
tion.51 The burden of proof on the issue of good faith is on the party
asserting the lack of good faith.
52
3. The test of good faith
Because only a settlement that a court finds to be in good faith will
alter the amounts ultimately borne by the nonsettling joint tortfeasors,
the decision as to whether the settlement was made in good faith is cru-
cial. It is this finding that triggers the release of the settling tortfeasor
47. The trial court is not empowered by § 877.6 to dismiss a cross-complaint for partial
indemnity against the settling defendant. The court may simply determine the settlement is in
good faith. This has the effect of barring the cross-complaint for partial indemnity. The set-
tling tortfeasor must then follow up the good faith finding with a motion for summary judg-
ment or motion for judgment on the pleadings which results in the dismissal of the cross-
complaint. IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 103 n.6, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438, 442 n.6
(1986).
48. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(a) (West Supp. 1986).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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from subsequent liability to his joint tortfeasors for partial indemnity. 3
As will be shown below, prior to the Tech-Bilt decision, the appel-
late courts disagreed regarding the proper definition of good faith. This
difference of opinion stemmed from a basic argument concerning which
of two conflicting policies behind the good faith settlement rule was more
important: (1) the policy of encouraging settlements, or (2) the policy of
equitable apportionment of loss among joint tortfeasors. 4 These two
policies conflict in the good faith settlement context.55
The goal of encouraging settlements is best accomplished by defin-
ing good faith so as to uphold the greatest number of settlements between
a willing plaintiff and a settling defendant. A defendant's desire for set-
tlement is increased in relation to how low he perceives the settlement
figure to be compared to the amount for which he would be responsible if
he did not settle.56 If a defendant's proposed settlement with the plaintiff
is not approved as a good faith settlement, he will be very reluctant to
settle with the plaintiff because that settlement will not completely re-
move him from the case.5 7 Therefore, settlements are encouraged by
53. For a complete discussion of the evolution of the definition of good faith and the vari-
ous tests used by the courts, see Roberts, supra note 24, at 896.
54. The policy considerations that must be considered in formulating a definition of a good
faith settlement are discussed in Roberts, supra note 24, at 882-98. For a discussion of how
courts have dealt with these policies, see id. at 899-904.
55. Roberts, supra note 24, at 822, 895-98; Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs.,
38 Cal. 3d 488, 494, 698 P.2d 159, 163, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 259-60 (1985); Singer Co. v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 875, 885, 225 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (1986); Abbott Ford, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1205, 1211-12, 228 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254 (1985).
56. Roberts, supra note 24, at 906.
57. The court in Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 505 n.2, 203 Cal. Rptr.
825, 829 n.2 (1984), opined that this point has been overemphasized:
A settling defendant undoubtedly desires to "close his books on a case" and may well
fear subsequent liability to his nonsettling co-defendants. We doubt, however, that
this fear will often cause the defendant to eschew a favorable settlement with the
plaintiff. After all, the plaintiff's claim poses the greatest and most immediate threat
to the defendant; liability to co-defendants is more remote and contingent. Most
defendants will be eager to rid themselves of the immediate threat from plaintiff, even
if this threat is thereby replaced with the less likely prospect of liability to a co-
defendant. Id.
The position of the Torres court seems somewhat unrealistic. While liability to a co-
defendant may be more remote and contingent than liability to a plaintiff, most rational de-
fendants will not be willing to pay a substantial sum of money to settle a case with the plaintiff,
only to have to face liability later to a co-defendant who is seeking to apportion damages. This
would place a settling defendant in a very precarious position. He must choose whether to
appear in the initial trial of the plaintiff's claims against the remaining co-defendants in order
to protect his position on the issues pertaining to plaintiff's total damages and the various
parties' negligence. Alternatively, he must choose simply to sit back and attempt to defend his
position on a co-defendant's claim for partial indemnity. In either event, his litigation ex-
penses will be the same as if he had not settled with the plaintiff, and his risk of liability may
not have diminished much. Of course, a real possibility exists that the case will never go to
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finding an even disproportionately low settlement to be in good faith.58
On the other hand, the second goal, equitable distribution of loss
among tortfeasors, is defeated when a disproportionately low settlement
is found to be in good faith, thereby leaving the nonsettling tortfeasors
saddled with the remaining portion of plaintiff's damages. Accordingly,
in order to foster the policy of equitable distribution of loss according to
fault, a settlement should be found to be in good faith only if it approxi-
mates the amount of the settling defendant's proportionate share of the
loss. 59
Therefore, the closer the definition of good faith moves toward re-
quiring the settlement to reflect the settling defendant's proportionate
fault, the more the policy of equitable apportionment of loss will be fos-
tered. However, the policy of encouraging initial settlements will be de-
emphasized. Conversely, the farther the definition of good faith moves
away from requiring proportionality, the more the policy of encouraging
initial settlements will be fostered. Yet, the policy of equitable appor-
tionment of loss will be correspondingly frustrated.6"
a. the tortious conduct test
Prior to the supreme court decision in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-
Clyde & Associates,61 most California appellate courts employed a tor-
tious conduct test to decide whether a settlement was in good faith.62
trial against the remaining co-defendants because they will subsequently settle with the plain-
tiff. Even so, unless the settlement between the plaintiff and the first settling tortfeasor is found
to be in good faith, the subsequently settling co-defendants can sue the first defendant for
partial indemnity and force him to pay the percentage of the total settlement that is in accord-
ance with his percentage of fault. See Mill Valley Refuse Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App.
3d 707, 166 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1980); American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Avco-Lycoming Div., 97 Cal.
App. 3d 732, 159 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978). Therefore, practically speaking, a defendant
will not settle with the plaintiff unless his settlement has been found to be in good faith.
58. For an argument that approving a disproportionately low settlement as being in good
faith fosters only partial settlement of litigation rather than total settlement, see Roberts, supra
note 24, at 888-91.
59. Roberts, supra note 24, at 896.
60. Id. at 897.
61. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
62. See, e.g., Henderson v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 297, 208 Cal. Rptr. 485
(1984), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d
488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985); Ford Motor Co. v.
Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt,
Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985); Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal. App. 3d
278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde &
Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985);
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This test resulted from the courts ranking the policy of encouragement of
settlements above the policy of equitable apportionment of loss among
tortfeasors. Carrying this ranking to the extreme, courts applying this
test held that any settlement, no matter how small in amount, was imper-
vious to attack by nonsettling joint tortfeasors as long as it was made
without tortious and wrongful intent. 3 Under the tortious conduct test,
the amount of the settlement between the plaintiff and the settling de-
fendant was irrelevant." A settlement so low that it bore no relationship
whatsoever to the settling defendant's probable ultimate liability under
comparative fault principles did not create a bad faith settlement." In-
stead, the only inquiry was whether the settling parties engaged in tor-
tious or other wrongful conduct against the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors 6
The fact that a settlement test had the effect of injuring a nonsettling
tortfeasor because it forced him to face an exposure to the plaintiff for an
amount far in excess of his fair share of liability under comparative fault
principles did not make the settlement tortious. In fact, such a result to
the nonsettling tortfeasors was recognized. 7 Under the tortious conduct
Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982), disap-
proved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159,
167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985); Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App.
3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs.,
38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985); Dompeling
v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Buit, Inc.
v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr.
256, 264 n.7 (1985); Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980),
disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500
n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
63. Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983); Burling-
ton N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982), disapproved,
Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7,
213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985); Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880,
176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal
3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
64. In Dompeling, the court stated "[b]ad faith is not established by showing that a settling
defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair share of the value of plaintiff's
case." Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44. See also Burlington North-
ern, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
65. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847-48
(1976), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d
488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
66. Wysong, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 288-89, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 679; Kohn v. Superior Court,
142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 327, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78, 81 (1983); Burlington Northern, 137 Cal. App.
3d at 945-46, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378; Cardio, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260;
Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
67. The Dompeling court stated:
Bad faith is not established by a showing that a settling defendant paid less than his
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test, the settling parties were specifically allowed "to further their respec-
tive interests without regard to the effect of their settlement upon other
defendants."68
theoretical proportionate or fair share of the value of plaintiff's case. A settlement
always removes the settling defendant from the action; this necessarily results in a
possibility that the remaining defendants will suffer judgment greater in amount than
if there had been no settlement.
Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
68. Id. at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45. "The settling parties owe the nonsettling defend-
ants a legal duty to refrain from tortious or other wrongful conduct; absent conduct violative
of such duty, the settling parties may act to further their respective interests without regard to
the effect of their settlement upon other defendants." Id.
The tortious conduct test is exemplified in Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal.
App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde &
Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985). In
Cardio, the plaintiffs were the widow and seven children of a man who died during open heart
surgery. The plaintiffs sued the hospital, several doctors, and Cardio, the distributor and man-
ufacturer of the heart lung pump machine which was a factor in the patient's death. The
hospital filed a cross-complaint for partial indemnity against Cardio. Before trial, the plaintiffs
and Cardio entered into a settlement whereby plaintiffs dismissed the complaint against Cardio
with prejudice in exchange for a waiver of costs. The hospital was forced to settle for an
amount in excess of its proportionate share of liability and then sought indemnity from Cardio.
Cardio defended against the hospital's cross-complaint for partial indemnity on the ground
that it had entered into a good faith settlement and, therefore, was released from partial indem-
nity claims. The appellate court agreed, holding that Cardio was released from liability on the
cross-complaint.
All parties benefitted from this settlement except the nonsettling joint tortfeasor. The
plaintiffs benefitted as a matter of trial strategy. The plaintiffs' attorney testified that while he
felt there was a substantial case against Cardio, he had a straightforward, uncomplicated case
against the hospital for the negligent act or omission of its employees in operating the heart
lung machine. Because the hospital had sufficient assets and sufficient insurance to pay the
judgment, he did not wish to complicate a simple medical malpractice case where there was
clear liability by bringing in a complicated products liability cause of action. Id. at 884-85, 176
Cal. Rptr. at 256-57. Clearly, Cardio also benefitted from this settlement. While plaintiff had
a substantial products liability action against Cardio, it was released from all liability for only a
waiver of costs. Cardio's waiver of costs was obviously not proportionate to Cardio's potential
liability to the plaintiffs.
The party adversely affected by this settlement was, of course, the nonsettling co-defend-
ant, the hospital. Because Cardio and the plaintiff had complied with the tortious conduct test,
the settlement was found to be in good faith. Accordingly, the hospital had no claim for
partial indemnity against Cardio. The hospital, therefore, had to pay the full amount of its
settlement with the plaintiff without any claim for reimbursement against Cardio (which prob-
ably was at least as much at fault as the hospital). For a discussion of the appellate court's
criticism of its own decision, see Roberts, supra note 24, at 871.
As illustrated by the Cardio case, everyone benefitted from the tortious conduct test of
good faith except the nonsettling joint tortfeasors. This test furthered the interests of the plain-
tiff and the settling defendant because it made an early relatively low settlement possible. Even
if the settlement was disproportionately low in terms of the settling defendant's fair share of
liability, the plaintiff and the settling defendant were helped by the settlement. The plaintiff's
interests were furthered because plaintiff, or his attorneys, received cash early in the litigation
that could be used to pay living, medical, and litigation expenses. Assuming there was a sol-
vent co-defendant against whom plaintiff had a reasonable case, plaintiff was not harmed by
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A plaintiff and defendant would rarely, if ever, settle with the pur-
pose of injuring a nonsettling joint tortfeasor. Only one court has found
such a situation.69 Thus, the tortious conduct test resulted in virtually all
settlements being found to be in good faith.70
settling with one of the joint tortfeasors because he could recover the full amount of a subse-
quently obtained judgment from that remaining co-defendant.
The settling defendant's interests were also furthered because he was able to settle the
litigation for a reduced amount. Because the tortious conduct test mandated that a dispropor-
tionately low settlement could be in good faith, the settling defendant was completely free from
the litigation and exposure to a judgment because the settlement cut off any claims for partial
indemnity.
The tortious conduct test also helped the courts because it made the good faith determina-
tion simple. A court need not examine the merits of the underlying action. Because the parties
asserting the lack of good faith had the burden of proof on the issue, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 877.6(d) (West Supp. 1986), unless the objectors could prove the settlement was entered into
for a tortious purpose, the settlement would be in good faith.
Thus, the only parties whose interests were adversely affected by the tortious conduct test,
which allowed disproportionately low settlements to be in good faith, were the nonsettling
joint tortfeasors. Because the good faith settlement barred any claim for partial indemnity by
the nonsettling tortfeasors against the settling defendant, the nonsettling party became obli-
gated to pay much more than his fair share for plaintiff's injuries.
69. An example of what constituted collusion under the tortious conduct test can be found
in Henderson v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 297, 208 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1984). In Hender-
son, the court found lack of good faith on the basis that the only possible motive for the
settlement was plaintiff's desire to insulate the settling tortfeasors from possible liability to the
nonsettling defendant on a cross-complaint. Id. at 300, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 486. In that case,
plaintiff brought a personal injury action arising out of an incident involving two gangs, and
claimed that defendant injured him with his automobile. The defendant, a member of one
gang, cross-complained against two members of the other gang who were the sister and close
personal friend of the plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff agreed to settle with these cross-
defendants for a total payment of $18,000. The cross-defendants then instituted proceedings to
find that their settlement had been made in good faith in order to relieve them from any
liability on the cross-complaint for partial indemnity. The appellate court found collusion
based on the relationship of the settling parties and their animosity toward the nonsettling
defendant, a member of a rival gang. Id. Because plaintiff had never suggested that he had
any claim for damages against either cross-defendant and did not name either of them as
defendants, the only possible motive for the settlement was to insulate them from possible
liability to the nonsettling defendant on the cross-complaint. Thus, the court found the settle-
ment was collusive and not in good faith, thereby leaving the parties to litigate the issue of
liability among themselves pursuant to the nonsettling defendant's cross-complaint for partial
indemnity.
70. Only three California cases have judged the good faith of a settlement by a test other
than the tortious conduct test. Two of the cases were the earliest to consider the meaning of a
good faith settlement and were decided before the tortious conduct test was established: River
Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972); Lareau
v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975). The River
Garden Farms court expressly rejected the absence of collusion as the sole criterion of good
faith. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505-06. Instead, under
its test, a settlement would be in good faith if it fell within a reasonable range of the settling
defendant's fair share of the ultimate recovery to be received by the plaintiff. Under this test,
the price of the settlement was relevant. If the amount was too low and was not within the
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Although almost universally adopted, the tortious conduct test was
not universally praised. Attorneys for nonsettling joint tortfeasors, com-
mentators,71 and judges72 criticized the test as working an undue hard-
ship on nonsettling parties and ignoring the policy of liability in
proportion to fault.
b. the supreme court decision in Tech-Bilt
In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates,73 the California
Supreme Court laid down new rules governing good faith settlements
and disapproved the tortious conduct test. Under the new Tech-Bilt
test, the price of the settlement became an important factor. Good faith
reasonable range of the settling defendant's fair share of the plaintiff's predicted recovery, then
the settlement would not be in good faith.
After River Garden Farms and Lareau, every appellate decision dealing with the defini-
tion of a good faith settlement adopted the tortious conduct test, with one notable exception,
Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984). To meet the test
of good faith, the Torres court held that the settlement figure could not be "grossly dispropor-
tionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling
defendant's liability to be." Id. at 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832. The Torres court reasoned that
the more flexible standard "should discourage fraudulent or sham settlements, as well as settle-
ments which are unfair because they are simply 'too cheap,'" and, "should encourage defend-
ants, who really do wish to 'close the book' on a matter, to arrive at a settlement figure which
bears some relationship to what is fair." Id.
71. Roberts, supra note 24, at 911-13.
72. Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984); Cardio
Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981), disapproved,
Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7,
213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
73. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 256 (1985).
The facts of Tech-Bilt are as follows: The plaintiffs, owners of a residential property,
brought an action against the developer (Tech-Bilt Construction Corporation), the soils engi-
neers (Woodward-Clyde and Associates), and others on various theories to recover for struc-
tural defects in their residence. During the early stages of the litigation it became apparent
that plaintiffs' action against Woodward-Clyde was barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tions. Woodward-Clyde's counsel told plaintiffs' counsel that he would file a motion for sum-
mary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Pursuant to this motion, Woodward-Clyde
would have been able to recover as costs its answer fee of $55. However, before the motion
was filed, plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the suit against Woodward-Clyde with prejudice in ex-
change for a waiver of costs. Thereafter, Tech-Bilt, the nonsettling defendant, filed an
amended cross-complaint for partial indemnity and declaratory relief against Woodward-
Clyde. Woodward-Clyde defended against this action by seeking an order under Code of Civil
Procedure § 877.6 to confirm its agreement with the plaintiff as a good faith settlement, thus
entitling it to summary judgment on Tech-Bilt's cross-complaint. After a hearing, the trial
court found the settlement to be in good faith and entered summary judgment dismissing
Tech-Bilt's cross-complaint against Woodward-Clyde. Tech-Bilt appealed and the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the settlement was in good faith because the
plaintiff and Woodward-Clyde had not intended to tortiously injure Tech-Bilt by entering into
their settlement. Id. at 491-92, 698 P.2d at 161-62, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
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is now determined by, among other things, whether the settling defend-
ant is contributing in accordance with his proportionate share of liability
in the case.
(i) the role of the good faith factor
The supreme court rejected the view of those courts applying the
tortious conduct test that the policy of encouragement of settlements is
primary and the policy of equitable apportionment of loss must be sacri-
ficed in order that settlements be encouraged. Because it completely ab-
rogated the policy of equitable apportionment of loss among joint
tortfeasors, this approach was too narrow. Instead, the supreme court
held that the requirement that a settlement be in good faith should be
applied to further both the policies of encouragement of settlements and
equitable allocation of loss among multiple tortfeasors. Thus, the good
faith requirement should be viewed as a means to accommodate these
competing but equally important policies.74
(ii) the reasonable range test
Armed with this view of the role of the good faith factor, the
supreme court adopted a good faith test7" which, for purposes of this
article, will be referred to as the reasonable range test. This test requires
some degree of proportionality between the settling defendant's payment
and his potential liability in order to have a settlement deemed to be in
good faith. "A more appropriate definition of 'good faith,' in keeping
with the policies of American Motorcycle and the statute, would enable
the trial court to inquire, among other things, whether the amount of the
settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's pro-
portional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries."'76 The
court identified eight separate factors that should be taken into account
in determining the good faith of a settlement.77
1. A rough approximation of plaintiff's total recovery.
2. The settlor's proportionate liability.
3. The amount paid in settlement.
4. The allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs.
5. A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement
than he would if he were found liable after a trial.
74. Roberts, supra note 24, at 902-03.
75. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
76. Id. This was the test proposed in Roberts, supra note 24, at 902-03.
77. These factors are numbered for purposes of analysis in this article but were not num-
bered by the court.
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6. The financial condition of the settling defendant.
7. The insurance policy limits of the settling defendant.
8. The existence of collusion, fraud or tortious conduct aimed
to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.78
The details of the reasonable range test are not clear. Beyond the
quotation and the factors set forth above, the supreme court did not ex-
plain the test further. Most of the court's opinion concerned its reasons
for adopting the reasonable range test. It did not elaborate on the specif-
ics of the approach.
Some guidance as to the specifics of the reasonable range test is pro-
vided by the case of River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court 79 and a
law review article.80 In adopting the test, the court relied extensively on
both. Factors 1, 2, 3, and 5 set forth by the supreme court in Tech-Bilt
are the same factors identified by the court in River Garden Farms and
the law review commentator as the factors to be utilized in determining
the reasonable range of a settling tortfeasor's fair share of liability for a
plaintiff's injuries.
The reasonable range test envisioned by those authorities did not
require strict proportionality, but rather that the settlement amount be
within a range of the settlor's proportionate share of plaintiff's dam-
ages.8 ' This range is to be established by the trial judge's analysis of
certain factors according to his expertise. The analysis should operate
with the trial judge: (a) making a rough approximation of the amount
plaintiff would recover after a trial; (b) approximating the amount of the
settling defendant's proportionate liability under comparative fault prin-
ciples, thereby determining the settling defendant's proportionate share
of plaintiff's damages; (c) reducing that figure by some amount as a rec-
ognition that a settling party should pay less in settlement in advance of
trial than he would if he were found liable after trial; and (d) comparing
that resulting number to the amount of the settlement.8 2 If the trial
judge, in his discretion, finds that it is close enough, then the settlement
will be found to be in good faith.83 The reasonable range test asks not for
precise numbers, but for an approximation. As stated by the court in
78. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
79. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
80. Roberts, supra note 24, at 917, 919-24.
81. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506; Roberts, supra
note 24, at 917.
82. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 919-24.
83. Like the California Supreme Court, this author does not dare speculate on what "close
enough" would be. Such an unanswerable question can be carefully avoided by directing the
matter to the "sound discretion of the trial judge."
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River Garden Farms, only a rough assessment of value would be possi-
ble. 4 Thus, the court does not attempt to determine the precise amount
of the parties' liability and plaintiff's injuries, but rather makes rough
approximations.
The type of reasonable range test that looks only to factors 1, 2, 3,
and 5 will be referred to as a "pure" reasonable range test." Under this
analysis, the policy of equitable apportionment of loss is given true equal
footing with the policy of encouragement of settlements because only
those settlements objectively falling within a certain range qualify as good
faith settlements. The peculiarities of the particular settling tortfeasor,
such as his financial condition, are given no special consideration and do
not enter into the analysis.8 6
III.. THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE SETTLING DEFENDANT AS
A FACTOR OF GOOD FAITH
The supreme court in Tech-Bilt seemed to retreat from a "pure"
reasonable range test and instead adopted a modified reasonable range
test. Under this test, the financial condition and insurance policy limits
of the settling joint tortfeasor are considered in determining whether a
settlement is in good faith.8 7 The court stated:
This is not to say that bad faith is "established by a showing
that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical propor-
tionate or fair share." Such a rule would unduly discourage
settlements. "For the damages are often speculative, and the
probability of legal liability therefor is often uncertain or re-
mote. And even where the claimant's damages are obviously
great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately
low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a rela-
tively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint
tortfeasor.
'8 8
Thus, the supreme court has mandated that a tortfeasor may enter into a
84. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
85. This was the test espoused by the Law Review article relied on by the court. See
Roberts, supra note 24.
86. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 932-35.
87. Tech-Bit, Inc., v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499, 698 P.2d 159, 166,
213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (1985); see also Barth-Wittmore Ins. Co. v. H.R. Murphy Enters., 169
Cal. App. 3d 124, 134, 214 Cal. Rptr. 894, 899 (1985) (reaffirming that "Tech-Bilt instructs the
trial court to consider the financial condition and insurance policy limits of the settling defend-
ant"). Id.
88. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (quoting Stam-
baugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847-48 (1976)).
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settlement for a lesser amount and the settlement will be in good faith if
the amount seems reasonable in light of the tortfeasor's financial condi-
tion and insurance policy limits.
The supreme court did not elaborate further on exactly how the fi-
nancial condition of a settling defendant should affect the court's deter-
mination of good faith in a particular case. Therefore, a crucial issue
which trial courts will face in applying the Tech-Bilt reasonable range
test is the extent to which the financial condition and insurance status of
a settling defendant should figure in the formula for a good faith settle-
ment. This issue is considered in the following sections of this Article. 9
A. The Merits of Utilizing Financial Condition as a Factor in
Determining Good Faith
The supreme court's directive to consider the financial condition
and insurance policy limits of a settling tortfeasor as part of the reason-
able range test of good faith departs from the "pure" reasonable range
test advocated by the authorities relied upon by the court in Tech-Bilt.
By including these two factors in the test, the supreme court undertook a
task similar to mixing oil and water, a difficult process. Just as oil and
water quickly separate, we may be left with two separate tests for good
faith-a reasonable range test that applies only to defendants with assets
well in excess of their fair share of liability for plaintiff's injuries, and
some different test for those who claim their settlement is reasonable
based on their financial condition.
Arguments can be made both for and against this "financial condi-
tion exception." 90 The primary negative argument is that the inclusion
of financial condition as a factor of good faith undercuts the core ration-
ale of the reasonable range test: to put the policy of equitable apportion-
ment of loss among tortfeasors on an equal footing with the policy of
encouragement of settlements. 91 When a low settlement amount is per-
mitted due to a defendant's financial condition, the nonsettling parties
are forced to pay an increased amount of plaintiff's judgment. Such an
exception based on financial condition, therefore, elevates the policy of
encouragement of settlements above the policy of equitable apportion-
89. See infra text accompanying notes 106-44 and 171-79.
90. The term "financial condition exception" is used in this article as a shorthand way to
refer to the situation where the settling joint tortfeasor's settlement is found to be in good faith
because of his financial condition, but otherwise would not be within the reasonable range of
his liability for plaintiff's damages.
91. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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ment of loss where a relatively insolvent 92 joint tortfeasor is involved.
Furthermore, judicial precedent for the financial condition excep-
tion is shaky at best. The supreme court in Tech-Bilt relied upon lan-
guage taken out of context from appellate court decisions which
contained dicta concerning a settling defendant's financial status. These
appellate decisions discussed financial condition in the context of the tor-
tious conduct test.93 Significantly, under that test the financial status of
the settlor was not relevant. The trial judge was required to look solely
to whether there was tortious conduct toward a nonsettling tortfeasor.
94
If none was found, the settlement would be in good faith, and the court
need not consider the amount of the settlement or the financial condition
of the settling defendant. For example, in Dompeling v. Superior Court,95
the court found there was no tortious conduct, and therefore the financial
condition of the settling defendant was irrelevant.
96
In creating the financial condition exception, the supreme court
inappropriately relied on dicta from Stambaugh v. Superior Court 97 stat-
ing that "a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in
the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint
tortfeasor."98 Because the tortious conduct test required no degree of
proportionality at all, it was completely logical for the appellate court in
Stambaugh to say this. By this language, the Stambaugh court was
merely explaining that the disproportionately low settlement in that case
was motivated by financial considerations, not inappropriate tortious
conduct.
However, in Tech-Bilt, the supreme court specifically rejected the
tortious conduct test in favor of the reasonable range test. Yet, the court
92. The term "relatively insolvent" will be used to describe a tortfeasor with insufficient
assets (including insurance) to pay the full amount of his proportionate share of plaintiff's
judgment.
93. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (citing Dompeling
v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 44 (1981)), disapproved, Tech-
Hilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213
Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985); Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 238, 132
Cal. Rptr. 843, 847-48 (1976), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde &
Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
94. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
95. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Wood-
ward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 264
n.7 (1985).
96. Id. at 810, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
97. 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt,
Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 256, 264 n.7 (1985).
98. Id. at 238, 132 Cal. Rtpr. at 847-48.
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adopted and quoted the Stambaugh dicta which discussed the "reasona-
bleness" of a settlement in terms of the settlor's financial condition.99
This reliance on Stambaugh was misplaced because the Stambaugh court
was discussing the criteria for the dissimilar tortious conduct test.
On the other hand, one very important reason exists to allow a rela-
tively insolvent tortfeasor's settlement to be in good faith even when not
proportional to his share of damages. This reason is based on the policy
of encouragement of settlements, one of the major policies to be balanced
in defining good faith."° Although not expressly articulated by the
Tech-Bilt court, a primary underpinning of the reasonable range test is to
encourage a rational and solvent defendant not only to settle 0 1 but also
99. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58 and infra note 103.
101. The reasonable range test provides an incentive to settle because the settlor may extri-
cate himself from the litigation for a reduced amount. This is because the test does not require
the settlement to be exactly proportional to what would be the tortfeasor's fair share of dam-
ages after a trial, but rather looks to see if the settlement is within a range of proportionality.
Also, it considers the fact that a settlement by definition is a lesser amount than the parties feel
would be awarded by a jury. Therefore, under this test a settling defendant can settle in good
faith for an amount less than what he expects will be his ultimate proportionate share of liabil-
ity to the other parties. He still may buy his peace from both the plaintiff and his joint
tortfeasors for a reduced sum, thereby providing a strong incentive to settle.
Also, there will be an incentive for defendants to settle early. Under the reasonable range
test as proposed, the earlier the settlement, the smaller it need be because the trial court will
consider when the plaintiff obtained the use of the money in determining the reasonable range.
Another incentive to early settlement is provided because this test gives the advantage to the
first defendant to settle. Because the amount of settlement can be below a settling defendant's
strict proportional share and still be in good faith, the nonsettling defendants will have to
account for any shortfall.
In addition to encouraging an early settlement with one tortfeasor, the reasonable range
test also promotes the policy of settlement of the entire litigation. Because the first settling
defendant settled within his reasonable range of liability, the second defendant will not be
facing a huge disproportionate judgment. The potential judgment against the remaining de-
fendant and the plaintiff's monetary demands upon him will be reasonably related to his
amount of fault, and, therefore, it is more likely that the second defendant will be willing to
negotiate a realistic settlement. Again, whether this will occur depends on the various parties,
their evaluation of the plaintiff's potential for recovery, and other factors peculiar to each case.
By way of example, a comparison between the tortious conduct test and the reasonable
range test for good faith as far as the encouragement of the settlement of the entire litigation is
concerned can be made as follows: Assume the plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of
$100,000 and sues A who is 80% at fault and B who is 20% at fault. If the plaintiff settles with
A for $5000, under the tortious conduct test this settlement would be found to be in good faith
absent any proof of tortious conduct. Defendant B would face potential liability of $95,000
even though he was only 20% at fault. It is unclear whether this potential verdict, completely
unrelated to his degree of fault, would force B into a settlement in excess of his percentage of
fault or whether it would compel B to take his chances at the trial. However, under the rea-
sonable range test, such a settlement would not be approved by the court. Thus, defendant A
would not want to enter into the settlement because he would still be liable on the cross-
complaints for partial indemnity. Under the reasonable range test, A's settlement would have
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to settle for an amount within a reasonable range of his fair share of
plaintiff's damages.10 2 Although the policy of encouraging settlements is
extremely important in the context of a good faith settlement,10 3 it does
not mean that we want to encourage all settlements, regardless of their
price. An equally important policy behind the reasonable range test is
that of equitable apportionment of loss.1" Unlike the tortious conduct
test, the reasonable range test does not allow a joint tortfeasor to settle
unreasonably cheaply. The desired result is that the plaintiff and the set-
tling defendant will renegotiate the settlement price upwards until it
reaches a point the court finds is within the reasonable range of the set-
tling defendant's fair share of liability and therefore in good faith. Thus,
to better reflect his anticipated proportionate share of liability. Because he cannot obtain
approval of an unreasonably cheap settlement, assume A decides to settle for $60,000 (still a
bargain) and the court finds that this amount is within the reasonable range of A's potential
liability to all parties. B still faces more than his proportionate share of liability, but the expo-
sure is not nearly as disproportionate as before. The plaintiff need not seek as much in settle-
ment from B in order to be compensated for his injuries because he received more from A.
Because the plaintiff can be satisfied with a lesser amount from B, and since B's potential
liability is more in keeping with his percentage of fault, it is probably more likely that the
plaintiff and defendant B will be able to reach a settlement and end the entire litigation. See
Roberts, supra note 24, at 929-30.
102. See supra text accompanying note 74.
103. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499-500, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
Perhaps the principal policy relevant to the issue of a "good faith" settlement is the policy
of encouragement of settlements. This policy has been identified by all cases discussing good
faith settlements. Roberts, supra note 24, at 883. As stated by the court in Stambaugh,
"The law wisely favors settlements.. ." "[I]t is the policy of the law to discour-
age litigation and to favor compromises of doubtful rights and controversies, made
either in or out of court." Settlement agreements "are highly favored as productive
of peace and goodwill in the community, and reducing the expense and persistency of
litigation." Indeed, it has been said that a major goal of section 877 is the "encour-
agement of settlements."
Stambaugh, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 236, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Torres
v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 504, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829 (1984); River Garden
Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 (1972).
California courts have stressed repeatedly that settlements and compromises are favored
by the law. See Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties, and Settlements, 65 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 1264, 1268 (1977); see also Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 150 P.2d 876,
878 (1944); Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 86, 91 Cal. Rptr. 301, 304
(1970).
104. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264; Roberts, supra
note 24, at 891-93. The importance of the policy of equitable apportionment of loss is clear
from Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829-30, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
875 (1975) (abrogating the rule of contributory negligence and adopting a system of compara-
tive negligence), and American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591, 578
P.2d 899, 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 190 (1978) (establishing that the loss among multiple
tortfeasors should be borne according to their percentage of fault). See also Torres, 157 Cal.
App. 3d at 504, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 828-29; River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993, 103
Cal. Rptr. at 503.
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the good faith reasonable range test does not seek .to encourage all settle-
ments but rather seeks to encourage somewhat proportional settlements
by nudging them up to the reasonable range area."' 5
However, the potential for upward renegotiation is not present with
a relatively insolvent defendant.- A defendant with limited assets will be
able or willing to pay only a limited amount. In other words, he can be
nudged only so far. At some point he will be unwilling to part with
assets needed to meet the expenses of daily living. For example, if de-
fendant A had a net worth of $200,000, it would be easier to nudge him
into settling with plaintiff for $30,000 than if defendant A had a net
worth of only $35,000. Taking this argument to its coficlusion, one could
assert that since the relatively insolvent tortfeasor at some point will be
unable or unwilling to settle for an amount within the reasonable range
of his fair share of liability, the court might as well encourag& the settle-
ment to go forward by finding it to be in good faith.
Of course, the other side of this argument is that it allows an unrea-
sonably cheap settlement at the expense of the policy of equitable appor-
tionment of loss.
B. Dealing with the Financial Condition Exception
Regardless of whether one agrees that there should be an exception
from the reasonable range test for a relatively insolvent, uninsured, or
underinsured joint tortfeasor, the supreme court embraced the exception
in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates.106 Therefore, the
next question is how to implement this exception at a good faith settle-
ment hearing. The following section of this Article focuses on this issue.
For purposes of this analysis, we will assume that a proposed settle-
ment amount does not fall within the pure reasonable range of the set-
tling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the
plaintiff's injuries. In other words, we will assume that the court has
applied the first three relevant factors of its good faith, test, namely, a
rough approximation of plaintiff's total recovery, a rough approximation
of the settlor's proportionate liability, and a recognition that the settlor
should pay less in settlement than if -found liable after a trial, and the
court has determined that the settlement amount does not fall within this
105. See Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 506, 203 Cal. Rptr: at 830.
106. 38 Cal. 3d 448, 698 P.2d 159, 213 'Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). The appellate decisions
interpreting Tech-Bilt have certainly so determined. Standard Pac. v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176
Cal. App. 3d 577, 582, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108-09.(1986); Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d
1141, 1177, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675, 698-99 (1985); Barth-Wittmore Ins. Co. v. H.R. Murphy En-
ters., Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 124, 134, 214 Cal. Rptr. 894, 899-900 (1985).
January 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:247
range. Thus, the settlement would not be in good faith were it not for the
settlor's financial condition.
1. The problem
Because Tech-Bilt carves out an exception for a relatively insolvent,
uninsured, or underinsured joint tortfeasor, a trial court must determine
what settlement amount will be in good faith given this particular settling
defendant's financial condition. To do this, a judge will probably use the
following method. First, the judge will perform the reasonable range
analysis; that is, make a rough approximation of plaintiff's total recovery
and the settlor's proportionate liability, and discount this figure by some
amount because the settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if
he were found liable after a trial. For the remainder of this Article, this
initial reduction will be referred to as the "settlement reduction." The
judge can thereby establish the lower end of the settlement range, i.e., the
lowest amount the judge would find to be in good faith were it not for the
settlor's financial condition. This figure will be referred to as "the rea-
sonable range floor." The judge must then determine how far below the
reasonable range floor the settlement price can fall because of the finan-
cial condition of this settling defendant. This additional reduction will be
referred to as the "insolvency reduction."
The judge may be faced with many different situations. The follow-
ing hypothetical reveals some of the possible variations. Assume again
that plaintiff has been injured by joint tortfeasors A, B, and C. By mak-
ing rough approximations, the judge would determine that the plaintiff's
damages are $100,000, that defendant A was 50% at fault, that defendant
B was 40% at fault, that defendant C was 10% at fault and that the
plaintiff was not at fault. Thus, A's fair share of plaintiff's damages
would be $50,000, B's would be $40,000 and C's would be $10,000. As-
sume also that if A wished to settle, the court would find A's reasonable
range floor to be $30,000. A's settlement reduction would, therefore, be
$20,000 (the difference between A's fair share of the damages and his
reasonable range floor).
Variation One: In this situation, defendant A is relatively insolvent.
His total assets consist of a bank account in the amount of $10,000.107 A
is an honorable man and, under this possible although highly unlikely
scenario, A wishes to clear his conscience and get on with his life. He is,
therefore, willing to offer the entire $10,000 in settlement. However, he
107. IfA were totally insolvent, having no assets, then this issue would never arise because
plaintiff would have no incentive to settle with him.
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wants to leave the lawsuit completely behind him and, accordingly,
wants the settlement to be found to be in good faith so he will not later
have to face additional claims by the other joint tortfeasors. The issue
then becomes whether this $10,000 settlement which is below A's reason-
able range floor is in good faith because ofA's financial condition. If it is
found to be in good faith, and the jury reaches a verdict identical to the
parameters set forth above, then A's $40,000 shortfall will be absorbed by
B and C in the ratio of 4 to 1. Thus, B will be paying $32,000 more for a
total of $72,000 and C will pay $8000 more for a total of $18,000.
In this situation, where a proposed settlement amount equals the full
amount that the settling defendant would be able to contribute to plain-
tiff's recovery, i.e., the amount that could actually be collected from him
after a judgment, one can argue that it makes sense to approve the settle-
ment even though it is below the reasonable range floor. By approving
this as a good faith settlement, and, therefore, relieving the settlor from
further liability on cross-complaints, no additional detriment will result
to the nonsettling joint tortfeasors. They would be liable for his shortfall
in any event. Whenever an insolvent defendant causes a co-defendant to
pay his shortfall, the policy of equitable apportionment of loss according
to fault is, by necessity, frustrated. Therefore, the policy of equitable
apportionment of loss will not suffer any additional frustration by a find-
ing that this type of settlement is in good faith.
Furthermore, a finding that such a settlement is in good faith .will
encourage the insolvent defendant to enter into the settlement with the
plaintiff and thereby the policy of encouragement of settlements will be
furthered. Thus, by finding the settlement to be in good faith, the rela-
tively insolvent tortfeasor will be encouraged to settle, the plaintiff will
get this amount of money at an earlier time, and no appreciable addi-
tional detriment will result to the nonsettling tortfeasors. Therefore,
there is little fault with a rule that allows a below reasonable range floor
settlement to be in good faith when the settlement amount basically ex-
hausts the tortfeasor's collectible assets.
On the other hand, the nonsettlors would argue that the settlement
should not be found to be in good faith because they will indeed be
harmed by such a result. They would prefer to be able to obtain the
judgment against A for partial indemnity otherwise precluded by a good
faith determination. Even though in this situation they will initially have
to bear A's shortfall, if they obtain a judgment against A, they can re-
cover some of this shortfall in the future if A acquires additional prop-
erty. Accordingly, they are not indifferent but are actually better off if
the settlement is not found to be in good faith.
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Of course, this strategy could backfire on the nonsettlors. Without a
good faith finding, A might not settle. Due to litigation or other ex-
penses, A might have less money at the time of trial to contribute to
plaintiff and would never acquire more money. Therefore, the nonset-
tlors would be worse off if the settlement did not go through. A solution
addressing "all of these concerns is offered in Parts 3-5 of this Article. 1°'
Variation Two: In this situation, the settling tortfeasor still does not
have the financial resources to make a settlement within the reasonable
range, but wishes to settle for an amount that is less than his collectable
assets. For example, consider our,'same hypothetical, but this time as-
sume that joint tortfeasor A has $25,000 in assets. He is a more typical
person than defendant .4 in variation one, and is not willing to donate his
'entire $252000 toward the settlement.' 0 9 Instead, he proposes a settle-
ment in the amou'iit of $10,000 which plaintiff is willing to accept.
Should this settlement be approved under the financial condition excep-
tion of Tech-Bilt.?
Unlike variation one, there is no dispute that a finding of good faith
would harm the nonsettling joint torffeasors." 0 If the settlement was
rejected by the coutt and defendant A did not settle, assuming a judg-
ment for, plaintiff along the parameters suggested above, A's $25,000
would be susceptible to execution either by plaintiff on the original judg-
ment, or by B and C after a judgment for partial indemnity. A would
lose his entire $25,000 (to the extent that his property is not exempt from
execution) and his shortfall would be $25,000 (his $50,000 fair share mi-
nus the $25,000 collected). This shortfall would ultimately be borne by
defendants B and C in proportion to their percentage of fault (a 4 to 1
ratio or 80% to 20%). Therefore, defendant B would end up paying
$20,000 of the shortfall, for a total payment of $60,000, and C would end
up paying $5000 of the shortfall, for a total payment of $15,000. The
same result would occur if A settles in spite of the lack of a good faith
finding and B and C obtain a judgment against him for partial indemnity.
However, if this settlement was found to be in good faith, then A 's
108. See infra text accompanying notes 111-44.
109. This will usually be the case because it is a rare defendant who will be willing to settle
in advance of trial for no less than could be collected from him after trial.
110. An argument could be made that it is impossible to determine whether defendants B
and C would be worse off if the settlement were found to be made in good faith. For example,
one could argue that if the settlement were not found to be in good faith, and A did not settle
with the plaintiff, A would need to continue with the litigation. Perhaps the $15,000 of the
assets he was attempting to retain would be consumed by litigation expenses. Should a judge-
ment be rendered, it is impossible to determine how much money A would be able to contrib.
ute either to plaintiff or to B and C.
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shortfall would not be $25,000, but rather $40,000. As we have seen in
variation one, under such a calculation defendant B would pay $72,000
while defendant C paid $18,000. Also, as in variation one, an additional
detriment to the nonsettlors is the inability to collect after-acquired as-
sets from A. Thus, a good faith finding in this type of situation would
definitely hurt the nonsettling joint tortfeasors.
Variation Three: In this situation the settling tortfeasor does have
sufficient assets to pay a settlement within the reasonable range of his fair
share of liability, but wants to settle for an amount below the reasonable
range floor. Assume the same facts as in variation two, except instead of
having assets of only $25,000, A has assets of $35,000. A does not want
to settle for the reasonable range floor ($30,000) because he would be left
with only $5000 to meet his day to day living expenses. Instead, under-
standably, he wishes to settle for a lesser amount, say $20,000, and wants
to have this approved as a good faith settlement to shield him from liabil-
ity to his joint tortfeasors. To justify such a finding, he will attempt to
utilize the financial condition exception of the Tech-Bilt decision. As
demonstrated above, a finding that such a settlement is in good faith will
work to the detriment of the nonsettling joint tortfeasors.
Unlike variation two, here the defendant A is not relatively insolvent
in the sense that he has insufficient assets to pay an amount within the
reasonable range of his fair share. However, it does not seem to be a
sensible distinction to require a defendant who has barely enough assets
to pay a price within the reasonable range to do so in order to have a
good faith finding (variation three), while at the same time, allow a de-
fendant who does not have enough assets to pay the reasonable range
floor escape with a much lower settlement (variation two).
2. Possible solutions
The above three variations illustrate different types of situations
where a trial judge will be asked to apply the financial condition excep-
tion of Tech-Bilt. How the trial judge can possibly make such distinc-
tions is difficult to imagine.
One possible alternative is for the judge to use a rule of thumb ap-
proach. Several possibilities are available. For example, he might decide
how much he thinks a defendant should retain after a settlement, and use
this as a measurement in all cases. For instance, a judge might determine
that in order for the settlement to be in good faith even though it is not
above the reasonable range floor, a settling defendant should be left with
only $10,000. Utilizing this approach, in variation two, defendant A who
had a net worth of $25,000 would not be able to settle in good faith for
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$10,000, but would need to contribute $15,000 in settlement. In varia-
tion three, defendant A with a net worth of $35,000 would be required to
contribute $25,000 in settlement. Alternatively, judges might choose to
use a percentage rule of thumb and say that a good faith settlement for
less than the reasonable range floor must constitute a certain percentage,
perhaps 80%, of the settlor's total net worth. While certainly easy to
apply, both of these approaches seem far too inflexible to take into ac-
count the specific financial concerns of each individual defendant.
3. Proposed solution - Step I
A more flexible and therefore more workable approach would be to
implement a reasonable person standard."' The court could determine
the amount for which a reasonable person in the financial condition of
this settling defendant should be willing to settle. In this way, the court
can take into account the peculiar financial condition of the particular
settling defendant, such as the amount, form, and liquidity of his assets;
his monthly income; whether he is employed; the number of his depen-
dents; the nature of his other obligations; and similar items. The require-
ment of reasonableness prevents the settling defendant from arbitrarily
dictating the amount that he is able to pay.
To calculate a settlement amount for a reasonable person in the fi-
nancial condition of the settling defendant, the judge by necessity will be
viewing the problem from the perspective of how much in assets a set-
tling defendant should retain. In this regard, courts should consider the
statutory exemptions allowed against execution of money judgments.
The California exemptions are among the most generous in the United
States.1I2 In general, the exemption provisions are intended to protect an
111. The Torres court employed a reasonable person approach in a different context. In
defining a good faith settlement, the court stated that "a defendant's settlement figure must not
be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would
estimate the settling defendant's liability to be." Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d
499, 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825, 832 (1984). This language from Torres was quoted by the
supreme court in Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 488, 698 P.2d at 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
112. 15 CAL. L. REvIsIoN COMM'N REPORTS 2023, 2075-76 (1980). California exempts
certain property from enforcement of a money judgment. These exemptions are codified in the
California Code of Civil Procedure as follows:
a. Certain motor vehicles including equity and proceeds of sale or insurance. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.010 (West Supp. 1986).
b. Household furnishings, appliances, and particular personal effects. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 704.020 (West Supp. 1986).
c. Materials purchased in good faith for the repair and improvement of a residence
(the value of the materials not to exceed $1,000). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.030
(West Supp. 1986).
d. Jewelry, heirlooms and works of art with an aggregate value not to exceed
$2,500. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.040 (West Supp. 1986).
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amount of property sufficient to support the judgment debtor and his
family, and to facilitate his financial rehabilitation. 13 For example, a
judgment debtor can obtain an exemption from wage garnishments for
the amount of his earnings necessary to support himself and his depen-
dent spouse and family." 4  Also, to a certain extent, his home,
automobiles and household furnishings are exempt," 5 again for the pur-
e. Certain health aids, i.e., wheelchairs and similar devices. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 704.050 (West Supp. 1986).
f. Personal property used for business, trade, or profession. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 704.060 (West Supp. 1986).
g. Certain paid earnings. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.070 (West Supp. 1986).
h. Portions of a deposit account to which the United States Government directly
deposits payments authorized by the Social Security Administration. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 704.080 (West Supp. 1986).
i. A $1,000 minimum for prison inmates trust funds. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 704.090 (West Supp. 1986).
j. Certain exemptions for life insurance, endowments and annuities. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 704.100 (West Supp. 1986).
k. Certain public retirement benefits. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.110 (West
Supp. 1986).
1. Public employee vacation credits. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.113 (West Supp.
1986).
m. Certain private retirement benefits. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.115 (West
Supp. 1986).
n. Unemployment and strike benefits. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.120 (West
Supp. 1986).
o. Disability or health insurance benefits. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.130 (West
Supp. 1986).
p. Certain damages or settlements for personal injury causes of action, CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 704.140 (West Supp. 1986); and/or wrongful death causes of action.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.150 (West Supp. 1986).
q. Workers compensation claim or award. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.160
(West Supp. 1986).
r. Certain social services aid or aid provided by charitable or fraternal benefit socie-
ties. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.170 (West Supp. 1986).
s. Certain relocation benefits paid by the government for displacement from a
dwelling. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 704.180 (West Supp. 1986).
t. Certain financial aid to students attending an institution of higher education.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.190 (West Supp. 1986).
u. Family and cemetery plots. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.200 (West Supp.
1986).
v. Certain homestead exemptions. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 704.710-704.850
(West Supp. 1986).
Also, the judgment debtor may claim as exempt the portion of his earnings necessary for his
support and the support of his spouse and family. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 706.051 (West
Supp. 1986).
113. 15 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, supra note 112, at 2075; see also infra note
117; Bailey v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 548, 554, 11 P.2d 865, 867 (1932); Vukowich, Debtors'
Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 782-88 (1974). It has also been suggested that early
exemptions were enacted to attract settlors in newly admitted states. See Haskins, Homestead
Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1950).
114. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 706.051 (West Supp. 1986).
115. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 704.010, 704.020, 704.710-704.850 (West Supp. 1986).
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pose of allowing the debtor to maintain his livelihood and a certain stan-
dard of living.
The substantive exemption provisions seek to accommodate both
the interest of the judgment debtor in maintaining his basic standard of
living and the interest of the judgment creditor in satisfying the money
judgment.I16 Exemption laws also serve to shift the cost of social welfare
for debtors from the community to judgment creditors."
17
The same principles seem applicable in the good faith settlement
context, and can be used to guide the judge in determining whether a
settlement below the reasonable range floor is too low to be in good
faith. The court should balance the nonsettling joint tortfeasors' interests
in having the settling defendant contribute as much in settlement as he is
financially able against the settling defendant's interest in retaining
enough of his assets to support himself and his family. The court cannot
allow the relatively insolvent settling defendant off too cheaply because
for every dollar he does not pay towards a good faith settlement, an addi-
tional dollar will have to be paid by the nonsettling defendants. How-
ever, the court should not set too great a settlement price as a
prerequisite for the good faith finding because this would either frustrate
the settlement attempt or coerce the settling tortfeasor into a settlement
which would leave him inadequate means of support.
By obtaining guidance from the exemption provisions, the trial
judge will have some basis for exercising his discretion in deciding just
how far below the reasonable range floor a settlement can be and still be
in good faith. The judge, of course, is not bound to apply the exemption
statutes verbatim. However, he should look to them inasmuch as they
reflect a carefully constructed statutory scheme to solve a similar prob-
lem of balancing one party's right to payment against the debtor's ability
to pay.
As an example, assume the judge is faced with the facts set forth in
variation two. The settlor, A, has $25,000 in assets, his reasonable range
116. 15 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, supra note 112, at 2076. See Comment,
Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1497-1502 (1959).
117. 15 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, supra note 112, at 2075-76; D. COWEN,
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 589, at 326 (1963); Committee on Debtor and Creditor
of the State Bar of California, Modernization of Statutory Exemptions, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 869,
873 (1967). Although it has been suggested that no property should be exempt and that insol-
vent debtors should rely on social welfare legislation, this alternative is undesirable because of
the cost to the community of providing welfare and the low level of available benefits. Addi-
tionally, most creditors are in a position to control their extension of credit. Further, the lack
of exemptions will drive greater numbers of debtors into bankruptcy. 15 CAL. L. REVISION
COMM'N REPORTS, supra note 112, at 2075 n.218; Comment, supra note 116, at 1497-1502.
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floor is $30,000,118 and he asks that a $10,000 settlement be found to be
in good faith because of his financial condition. The judge should not
simply approve the settlement because A is "relatively insolvent."
Rather, he needs to screen carefully A's entire financial situation, paying
close attention to such things as the amount, form and liquidity of A's
assets; the amount of A's equity in encumbered assets; the nature of A's
other obligations; his income; his employment situation and future
projects; his dependents and their other sources of support; and the na-
ture and extent of A's day to day expenses. 119
The result at the good faith hearing will vary depending on A's par-
ticular situation. For instance, assume A lives in a rental apartment, has
a secure job and makes enough money to cover his expenses, has no de-
pendents, and has a net worth of $25,000 in the form of a $12,000 bank
account and a $13,000 yacht. Taking guidance from the exemption pro-
visions, the judge would realize that neither the bank account nor the
yacht are the types of assets the legislature thought worthy of protection
in the case of a judgment debtor. Analogously, they should not be af-
forded protection in the good faith settlement context either. Presuma-
bly, under this version of the facts, the judge would find A's proposed
$10,000 settlement too low to be in good faith so as to shield him from
any additional liability. There is no reason A should be allowed to retain
the additional $15,000 rather than contribute a substantial portion to-
ward the plaintiff's injuries of which his actual proportional share is
$50,000.
On the other hand, the result should be different if A's financial facts
are changed. Assume again A's reasonable range floor is $30,000, A has
$25,000 in assets, and wishes to make a $10,000 settlement. However,
under this version of the facts, A is self-employed in a small marginally
successful business that has peak periods and slow periods. He is the sole
support of his spouse, three school age children, and an invalid mother.
His $25,000 in assets are in the form of $10,000 in equity in the family
home, $12,000 in business vehicles and equipment, and $3000 in the
bank. Again, studying the exemption provisions, the judge could see that
the small equity in the family home and the business vehicles and equip-
ment are the types of assets that the legislature had determined should be
118. See supra text accompanying note 107. Note this "floor" already reflects a substantial
discount over A's fair share of damages of $50,000. This discount is attributable to such things
as the uncertainties of litigation, the fact that one expects to pay less in settlement than if found
liable after a trial, and the present value of money.
119. Of course, the amount of A's insurance is also quite relevant. However, this type of
analysis only concerns the amount of A's liability for which he has insufficient insurance. For
ease of analysis and illustration, it is assumed that A has no insurance.
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protected in the judgment debtor context. Similar reasons exist for pro-
tecting them in the good faith settlement context. Virtually all of A 's
assets are necessary for A's family's support and maintenance, including
the $3000 bank account as a cushion for the business' slow periods.
Under these facts, the judge would probably determine that A 's $10,000
settlement is reasonable considering his financial condition and, there-
fore, is in good faith.
Thus, the judge can use the above approach to determine whether
the settlement is in an amount for which a reasonable person in the de-
fendant's financial condition would settle. If the judge finds this to be the
case, he should rule that the settlement is in good faith.
4. Proposed solution - Step II
Some judges will be tempted to stop their analysis at this point.
They will simply enter an order that the settlement is in good faith.
However, by so doing, they will forever release the settling tortfeasor
from claims for partial indemnity by the nonsettling joint tortfeasors.
a. the problem
Such a solution to the financial condition issue only deals with half
of the problem. While it focuses on what the settling tortfeasor can af-
ford to pay at that point in time, it does not attempt to mitigate the basic
problem of unfairness to the nonsettling joint tortfeasors. Although a
good faith settlement will probably always work to the financial detri-
ment of the nonsettling joint tortfeasors, the harm is multiplied if the
settling defendant's good faith finding is predicated upon the financial
condition exception. In such a situation, the shortfall that must be borne
by the nonsettling tortfeasors is greater than that warranted under a pure
reasonable range test. With a solvent joint tortfeasor's good faith settle-
ment, the nonsettlors bear the shortfall caused by the settlement reduc-
tion.120 However, with a relatively insolvent joint tortfeasor's good faith
settlement, the nonsettlors must bear not only this amount but also the
additional shortfall caused by the insolvency reduction. 121
A good faith finding, without more, gives the defendant who can
establish a poor financial condition at the time of the good faith hearing a
definite windfall that would unduly harm the nonsettlors in the situation
where the settling defendant acquired other assets after the good faith
order was entered. A settling defendant could come to court, show poor
120. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
121. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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financial condition, have his settlement approved as being in good faith
even though it was well below the reasonable range floor, and be forever
released from further responsibility. Thereafter, even if he acquired sig-
nificant other assets, the good faith finding would prevent the nonsettlors
from obtaining reimbursement for any of the settling defendant's
shortfall that they initially had to bear.
b. a proposed approach
The proposed solution is based on the premise that a settling defend-
ant claiming the financial condition exception should be treated the same
as any other insolvent judgment debtor. An insolvent judgment debtor is
not completely absolved of responsibility for that portion of his debt that
he is unable to pay at the time of judgment. His after-acquired property
can be utilized by the judgment creditor to satisfy the judgment. 22 A
judgment remains enforceable for ten years, 23 and that ten year period
can be expanded by either filing a new action on the unsatisfied amount
of the judgment,'24 or filing an application for renewal of the judg-
ment. 125 Thus, the judgment creditor may enforce his judgment on any
nonexempt property acquired by the judgment debtor during the period
that the judgment is enforceable.' 26
122. For example, a judgment lien may be obtained on real property acquired by the judg-
ment debtor after the creation of the lien. In such a case, the lien attaches at the time the
property is acquired. Hertweck v. Fearon, 180 Cal. 71, 73, 179 P. 190, 190-91 (1919); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 674(a) (West 1980); 15 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, supra note 112,
at 2045.
Similarly, a judgment lien on personal property may be obtained by filing a notice of
judgment lien in the office of the Secretary of State. See CAL. COM. CODE §§ 9401, 9403 (West
1964); 15 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, supra note 112, at 2046. This judgment lien
extends to after-acquired property of the type to which the judgment lien initially attaches. 15
CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, supra note 112, at 2047.
123. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 683.020 (West Supp. 1986).
124. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.5 (West 1982).
125. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 683.120 (West Supp. 1986).
126. As a general rule, all non-exempt property of the judgment debtor is subject to enforce-
ment procedures to satisfy a money judgment. 15 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS,
supra note 112, at 2035. A number of enforcement procedures are available for collection of a
money judgment, the simplest and most common being execution. Id. at 2051. With certain
exceptions, all of the judgment debtor's nonexempt property, tangible and intangible, may be
levied upon under a writ of execution. In general, the property levied upon is sold if the
property is tangible and is either collected or sold if the property is a debt. Id. at 2051-52.
Additionally, the judgment creditor may garnish the wages of the judgment debtor as they are
earned in order to satisfy the judgment. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 706.010-706.154 (West
Supp. 1986).
The judgment creditor may periodically examine the debtor, or a third person who pos-
sesses property of or is indebted to the judgment debtor, in order to discover property and
apply it to the satisfaction of the money judgment. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 708.110 (West
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Similarly, in the multi-tortfeasor situation, an insolvent joint
tortfeasor remains liable to his joint tortfeasors for the excess they paid
the plaintiff due to his insolvency. The tortfeasors can obtain judgments
against each other, including an insolvent joint tortfeasor, for partial in-
demnity. Such a judgment can be collected in the same way as any other
money judgment, 127 and thus extends to after-acquired property.
In Paradise Valley Hospital v. Schlossman,1 28 the court actually ap-
portioned the insolvent defendant's shortfall among the solvent defend-
ants. It held that the solvent defendants must bear the burden of the
shortfall caused by the insolvency of a co-defendant in direct proportion
to their respective degrees of culpability. However, in apportioning lia-
bility among the solvent defendants, the court concluded that the trial
court should also "fashion enforceable orders which will implement the
basic objective of making available to the solvent parties any asset of [the
insolvent defendant] lawfully subject to seizure." '129 Thus, the insolvent
joint tortfeasor was not freed from future liability for that portion of his
debt that had to be paid by the settling joint tortfeasors. Instead, even
though the court ordered that the solvent parties had to pay the plaintiff
for the insolvent's share, the solvent parties were given an order against
the insolvent tortfeasor for the amount so paid which could be enforced
in the same manner as any other money judgment.
This approach can be used to form the basis of a solution to the
problem of a good faith settlement in the case of the relatively insolvent
Supp. 1986). Examination proceedings are initiated by an application for an order that a judg-
ment debtor or third person appear and answer questions concerning the judgment debtor's
property. A judgment debtor may be examined once every 120 days or more frequently where
a writ of execution has been issued and thejudgment creditor shows that there is property that
the judgment debtor "unjustly refuses" to apply toward the satisfaction of the judgment. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.110 (West Supp. 1986).
Also, the judgment creditor may serve interrogatories upon the judgment debtor to dis-
cover any property in the possession of the judgment debtor. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 708.020 (West Supp. 1986). The form of, answers to, and enforcement of the interrogatories
is identical to that provided for interrogatories in a civil action. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 708.020(c) (West Supp. 1986). Generally, interrogatories may be served every four months.
The precise language of the statute provides that interrogatories may not be served if within
the preceding 120 days the judgment debtor has responded to past judgment interrogatories or
an examination has been conducted. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.020(b) (West Supp. 1986);
see J. LEVITr & D. NAFTALIN, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION MANUAL §§ 9.1, 9.3, 9.8A
(Cal. Continuing Educ. of the Bar, Supp. 1986).
127. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
128. 143 Cal. App. 3d 87, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1983).
129. Id. at 94, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 536-37. The court noted that an excellent discussion of the
details of such an order could be found in Zavos, Comparative Fault and the Insolvent Defend-
ant: A Critique and Amplification of American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 14
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 775, 827-31 (1981).
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settling joint tortfeasor. The proposed solution will accomplish three
purposes: (1) it will encourage the relatively insolvent joint tortfeasor to
settle by giving him the benefit of an early settlement; (2) it will minimize
the corresponding harm to the nonsettling joint tortfeasors; (3) it will
provide a workable solution for the trial judge.
This solution would involve a three step process. First, the court
would determine the reasonable range floor, i.e., assuming the settlor
were solvent, what amount of settlement would be the lowest amount
that the court would find to be in good faith. Second, the court would
use the reasonable person test described above 131 to determine whether
the settlement amount is what a reasonable person, in the financial condi-
tion of the settling defendant, would pay. If the amount satisfies these
criteria, the court would enter an order that the settlement is in good
faith. Third, the court would order that in the event that a remaining
defendant is forced to pay the plaintiff an amount in excess of that re-
maining defendant's share of liability, then the settling defendant must
pay a certain amount to the remaining defendant. The amount would be
the lesser of (a) the difference between the reasonable range floor and the
amount of the good faith settlement, i.e., the insolvency reduction;13 1 and
(b) the amount actually paid by the remaining defendant to the
plaintiff.
13 2
Under this solution, a good faith finding would have the usual result
that the nonsettling joint tortfeasors would be liable for the entire
amount of the plaintiff's judgment reduced only by the settlement. How-
ever, while the nonsettling joint tortfeasors would initially have to pay
for the shortfall caused by the insolvency reduction, they could ulti-
mately recover this amount when and if the insolvent settling joint
tortfeasor obtained assets. It is important to note that the remaining de-
fendants are not allowed to recover any of the shortfall they pay as a
130. See supra text accompanying notes 111-19.
131. For a definition of this term, see supra text accompanying note 107.
132. Since partial indemnity is an equitable doctrine created by the court in American Mo-
torcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591-98, 578 P.2d 899, 907-12, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182, 190-95 (1978), the court could also fashion enforceable orders which would implement
this proposal.
The correct implementation is by way of an order. Money collection procedures in Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure §§ 681-724 are provided for judgment creditors. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 681-724 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). However, California Code of Civil Proce-
dure § 1007 provides that an order for the payment of money may be enforced by execution,
the same as judgments. Under that section, parties to an order should have the same remedies
as a judgment creditor. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1007 (West 1980); Zavos, supra note 129, at
828. The mechanics of a similar type of order can be found in Zavos, supra note 129, at 828-
31.
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result of the settling defendant's settlement reduction.'
The way this solution would work can be illustrated by our example.
Assume a plaintiff has suffered approximately $100,000 in damages and a
jury would find defendant 4 to be 50% at fault, defendant B to be 40% at
fault, and defendant C to be 10% at fault. Defendant A wishes to settle
prior to trial, and the judge determines that the reasonable range floor of
a settlement based on his approximate liability for plaintiff's injuries is
$30,000, i.e., if A were completely solvent, the judge would not find a
settlement for less than $30,000 to be in good faith. However, defendant
A claims he can not pay $30,000 because he is relatively insolvent, having
only $25,000 in assets. His proposed settlement is $10,000. The judge
would then consider A's financial condition and decide whether a reason-
able person in A 's shoes would settle for $10,000. If he would, then the
judge should find the settlement to be in good faith. However, the judge
would also issue an order holding 4 liable to B and C for the insolvency
reduction, i.e., the difference between the settlement amount ($10,000)
and the reasonable range floor ($30,000), or $20,000, in the event that B
or C are required to pay the plaintiff this amount because of A's shortfall.
This proposed approach has several factors to recommend it. First,
it fits within the Tech-Bilt mandate because it takes the settling defend-
ant's financial condition into account in determining whether a settle-
ment is in good faith. Second, within these parameters, the approach
works to the benefit of all concerned.
The relatively insolvent settling joint tortfeasor is helped by this so-
lution in several ways. The most important is that it allows him to settle,
thereby enabling him to obtain the benefits of a good faith settlement
even though he cannot afford to pay an amount equal to the reasonable
range floor. In our example, if a settlement amount equalling the reason-
able range floor ($30,000) were required for a good faith settlement re-
gardless of defendant 4s financial condition, and 4 could not afford to
pay this much, he would not be able to effectuate a good faith settlement
and would not be able to extricate himself from the litigation.
This approach retains the incentive for a relatively insolvent joint
tortfeasor to settle. This is because the settling tortfeasor is completely
absolved of responsibility for the amount of the settlement reduction, just
as a solvent settling defendant.would be. In our hypothetical, if defend-
ant A did not settle and plaintiff was successful at trial, .4 would ulti-
mately incur a liability of $50,000, the full share of his proportionate
133. For a definition of this term, see supra text accompanying note 107.
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responsibility for plaintiff's injuries.13 4 In contrast, under the proposed
approach, A's maximum total exposure is $30,000, the amount of the
reasonable range floor. He would pay plaintiff $10,000 in settlement and
would be liable to the joint tortfeasors for $20,000. Even though the
proposal requires the court to issue an order making him liable to the
nonsettling joint tortfeasors, the amount will be no more than the differ-
ence between the reasonable range floor and his settlement (the insol-
vency reduction). He still reduces his potential total exposure by the
$20,000 settlement reduction. Also, because his settlement in an amount
less than the reasonable range floor will be in good faith, he avoids fur-
ther involvement in the case and further litigation expenses. Thus, the
relatively insolvent joint tortfeasor will have the same incentives to settle
as a solvent joint tortfeasor. He still obtains all the advantages of an
early settlement provided by the reasonable range test.13
He also gets additional benefits because the amount of the insol-
vency reduction does not have to be paid to the plaintiff as part of the
settlement in order for the settlement to be found in good faith. Rather,
it becomes a debt he owes to the nonsettling joint tortfeasors which be-
comes collectable only if the plaintiff eventually obtains the settling de-
fendant's shortfall from the other joint tortfeasors. Furthermore, this
debt can only be collected in the same manner as any money judgment
can be enforced. The settling defendant will be entitled to all of the pro-
tections from execution provided by law.136
134. He would actually be jointly and severally liable for $100,000, the full amount of plain-
tiff's injuries. However, assuming that through suits for partial indemnity responsibility was
ultimately apportioned among A, B, and C according to their percentages of fault, A, who was
50% at fault, would eventually bear $50,000 of the loss.
135. As mentioned earlier, the reasonable range test of good faith does provide an incentive
to settlement because a settling defendant may extricate himself from the litigation for a re-
duced amount. This is because this test does not require exact proportionality but rather fo-
cuses on whether a settlement is within a range of proportionality. Also, the test takes into
account the fact that a settlement by definition is a lesser amount than the parties feel would be
awarded by a jury. Therefore, under this test a settling defendant can settle in good faith for
an amount less than what he expects will be his ultimate proportionate share of liability to the
other parties. He may still buy his peace from both the plaintiff and the joint tortfeasors for a
reduced sum, thereby providing a strong incentive to settle. Moreover, there will be an incen-
tive for defendants to settle early. The earlier the settlement, the smaller it need be because in
determining the reasonable range, the court should consider when the plaintiff obtained the use
of the money.
Another incentive to early settlement is provided because this test gives the advantage to
the first defendant to settle. Because the amount of settlement can be below a settling defend-
ant's strict proportional share and still be in good faith, the first defendant to settle will be able
to cut off claims for partial indemnity for a reduced amount. See supra note 101 and accompa-
nying text.
136. See supra note 112.
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Of course the insolvent settling tortfeasor would prefer to have his
$10,000 settlement amount found to be in good faith and incur no obliga-
tion to repay the nonsettlors for any of the insolvency reduction. How-
ever, this would be a windfall to the insolvent settling party because he
would obtain a benefit unavailable to any other insolvent judgment
debtor. This windfall is not necessary to accomplish the purposes of a
good faith settlement and would unduly harm the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors.
This suggested approach also benefits the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors. It minimizes their potential harm because they at least have
a chance to recoup the shortfall occasioned by the settling defendant's
poor financial condition at the time of the settlement. Taking our above
example, assume A was solvent and settled for an amount equal to the
reasonable range floor and this was found to be a good faith settlement.
Then B and C would have to make up the shortfall caused by A's settle-
ment (the settlement reduction); i.e., $20,000 computed by subtracting
the reasonable range floor of $30,000 from A's share of liability of
$50,000. In our example, where A is insolvent and seeks to settle for
$10,000 because of his financial condition, if a court merely found that
settlement to be in good faith, without more, then the shortfall that
would have to be paid by the joint tortfeasors would be $40,000 without
chance of reimbursement. Under the suggested approach, while B and C
initially would have to pay A's total $40,000 shortfall, their financial
harm is minimized to the extent that they will at least have a chance to
recoup the amount of the shortfall caused by A's poor financial condition
(the insolvency reduction), here $20,000.
Another party to be considered in analyzing the suggested approach
is the plaintiff. The proposal will cause the plaintiff no detriment. Plain-
tiff's total recovery is not diminished because he can obtain the full
amount of his judgment from the solvent tortfeasors. The proposal's im-
pact, then, is with respect to the allocation of loss among the joint
tortfeasors. It will have no impact on the plaintiff's total recovery. Fur-
thermore, assuming that plaintiffs are benefited by a rule that encourages
settlements, the suggested approach actually assists plaintiffs because it
gives an incentive to the relatively insolvent joint tortfeasor to settle.
37
The approach encourages settlement more than a rule applying a pure
reasonable range test in which the financial condition of the settling de-
fendant is not considered. However, it probably does not encourage an
insolvent tortfeasor to settle as much as would a rule simply providing
137. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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that a low settlement is in good faith.13 Whether this latter type of rule
would actually encourage settlement of the entire litigation is open to
debate. 139
Finally, the suggested approach must be considered from the stand-
point of the trial judge. Although it has both advantages and disadvan-
tages, it generally appears to be the most workable solution. Whenever a
settling defendant claims he is relatively insolvent, the parties and the
court will need to analyze comprehensively the settling defendant's finan-
cial condition to determine whether a settlement below the reasonable
range floor is in good faith. The settling defendant will attempt to mini-
mize" and the nonsettling joint tortfeasors will attempt to maximize
141
the amount the settling defendant should pay. Without this proposed
solution, the court's conclusion is crucial. For every dollar not paid by
the settling defendant because of his insolvency, an additional
nonrecoverable dollar will be paid by the nonsettlors. To perform any
sort of meaningful calculation, the court would need to ascertain in great
detail the total financial situation of the settling defendant.
However, under the proposed solution, the need for such a detailed
examination is mitigated. The court will first establish the reasonable
range floor of the settling defendant. Once the court finds that the de-
fendant's financial condition warrants a lower settlement, it need only
make a less precise determination that the settlement amount is what a
reasonable person, in the defendant's financial condition, would be will-
ing to pay in settlement. The parties will not become embroiled in a
bitter battle over every potential settlement dollar. The nonsettlors will
be able to recover the amount of the insolvency reduction from the set-
tlor later if they can find, or if he acquires, assets subject to execution.
138. Of course the insolvent defendant would be happier with a rule which did not have the
extra effect of holding him liable to the nonsettlors for the insolvency reduction. Plaintiff's
attorneys have repeatedly argued that plaintiffs are helped by any rule which allows a settle-
ment to be in good faith, regardless of its amount.
139. Roberts, supra note 24, at 932-35.
140. The way the settling defendant will attempt to minimize the amount he should pay is
by entering into as low a settlement as he can with the plaintiff. He will then attempt at the
good faith hearing to convince the court that in light of his poor financial condition, the low
settlement he entered into with the plaintiff should be found to be in good faith.
141. The nonsettlors will attempt to maximize the amount the settling tortfeasor should pay
by arguing at the good faith hearing that the settling tortfeasor's financial condition allows him
to contribute more, i.e., that the proposed settlement is too far below the reasonable range
floor. They will contend that, therefore, this settlement should not be found to be in good
faith. If the court agrees, the settling tortfeasor can then settle for this amount anyway,
thereby remaining liable to claims for partial indemnity by the nonsettlors; or, he can agree to
pay the plaintiff more, come back into court, and attempt to have the increased settlement
amount found to be in good faith.
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This eliminates the pressure on the trial judge to make a precise analysis
of the exact amount the settling defendant can afford to pay.
Of course, this approach imposes upon the trial judge the task of
setting a specific amount for the reasonable range floor. Fixing such an
exact figure is not necessary in applying the reasonable range test with a
solvent joint tortfeasor. There, the court is not required to specify a rea-
sonable range, but rather need only see whether the settlement falls
within the reasonable range. The Tech-Bilt court explained this as deter-
mining whether the settlement is in "the ballpark."' 42 In this circum-
stance, the court need not deal in specifics, only rough approximations.
Thus, one can argue that this proposed solution for insolvent tortfeasors
imposes an additional and substantial burden on the trial judge.
However, this burden is not substantial, and it may not even be in
addition to that encountered with a solvent settling defendant. Establish-
ing the reasonable range floor can also be done by a rough approxima-
tion.1 43 Furthermore, practically speaking, even with a solvent joint
tortfeasor a judge will need to approximate the reasonable range floor
before he can determine whether a settlement is within the reasonable
range. Finally, it will not be difficult for the trial judge to set the reason-
able range floor. It is a figure more capable of evaluation using the exper-
tise of a judge than would be the burden of having to be more fastidious
in examining a settlement in relation to the financial condition of a joint
tortfeasor.
5. Summary
The suggested approach is one solution to the problem of applying
the financial condition factor to a good faith settlement determination.
As far as the settling and nonsettling joint tortfeasors are concerned, this
approach is a compromise between two alternatives, each of which would
have a significantly greater impact on one of the parties. Under the first
alternative, the financial condition of the settling tortfeasor is not taken
into account and he is held to the same reasonable range standard as a
solvent joint tortfeasor. To the extent that a tortfeasor could not afford a
settlement within the reasonable range, he would not be able to effectuate
a good faith settlement and would remain liable for the full percentage of
142. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. See also Singer v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 875, 894, 225 Cal. Rptr. 159, 178 (1986).
143. See Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263; Roberts, supra
note 24, at 921-23.
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his fault after judgment. 1" This approach hurts the tortfeasor attempt-
ing to settle more than does the suggested approach, under which he
remains liable to the joint tortfeasors for only the insolvency reduction,
i.e., the difference between the reasonable range floor and the amount of
his settlement. The other alternative is to simply find that a settlement
below the reasonable range is in good faith if that settlement amount is
reasonable in light of the settling defendant's financial condition. While
this would help insolvent defendants wishing to settle, it would hurt the
nonsettling joint tortfeasors who would be required to make up for the
shortfall caused by the settling tortfeasor's insolvency. The suggested ap-
proach treats a settling insolvent the same as an insolvent who did not
settle in good faith in that after-acquired assets would be subject to exe-
cution by those who had to bear his insolvency shortfall in the first place.
Furthermore, this approach will not harm, and may even benefit, the
plaintiff and provides a workable solution for the trial judge.
IV. THE INSURANCE POLICY LIMITS OF THE SETTLING DEFENDANT
AS A FACTOR OF GOOD FAITH
Another good faith factor discussed by the court in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v.
Woodward-Clyde & Associates 145 is the amount of insurance of the set-
tling defendant. Quoting Stambaugh v. Superior Court,14 6 the Tech-Bilt
court stated: "[A] disproportionately low settlement figure is often rea-
sonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underin-
sured, joint tortfeasor."' 47 Included in the list of factors enumerated by
the supreme court to determine good faith is the "insurance policy limits
of settling defendant." '148 Therefore, another issue that trial judges must
address in applying the reasonable range test is what effect, if any, the
insurance coverage of the settling defendant should have in the determi-
nation of good faith.
The most important issue that arises is whether a settlement should
be found to be in good faith solely because it is for the total amount of a
defendant's insurance policy limits. No appellate court, even using the
tortious conduct test, has directly held that the sole fact that an insur-
ance carrier has paid its policy limits to plaintiff constitutes a good faith
144. Thus, the nonsettling joint tortfeasors would be able to collect their full percentage
share from him to the extent that he acquired assets.
145. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
146. 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976), disapproved by inference, 38 Cal. 3d
488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 n.7 (1985).
147. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (quoting Stam-
baugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848 (1976)).
148. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
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settlement as a matter of law. In Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz,149 the trial
court made such a finding,150 but the court of appeal reversed this por-
tion of the decision stating that such a rule is without support from any
authority."5 ' However, before Tech-Bilt was decided, several California
appellate courts applying the tortious conduct test commented in dicta
that the settlement involved was in good faith because it was for the full
amount of the settling tortfeasor's insurance coverage. The court in
Stambaugh stated, "[w]e opine that it would be a rare case indeed,
where, as here, a joint tortfeasor who.., settles for the full amount of his
insurance coverage, may reasonably be charged with lack of good faith
under section 877. " 152 Similarly, the court in Fisher v. Superior Court 153
declared, "[w]hen the insurance company for a settling defendant pays
its total available policy limits, that is very strong evidence of a 'good
faith' settlement, absent evidence of collusion or grossly inappropriate
allocation or apportionment of the settlement proceeds to injure the non-
settling alleged tortfeasors."'
154
However, this language from cases involving insurance policy limits
must be considered in the context of the tortious conduct test. Under
that test, a settlement would be rejected only if the court found evidence
of some sort of intent to injure the nonsettling joint tortfeasors. There-
fore, the courts looked on a settlement for full policy limits as evidence
that the motivation for this settlement price was not tortious. As the
court stated in Fisher,
It would be extremely difficult to envision a set of circum-
stances in which an insurance company would pay out its entire
substantial policy limits (as was apparently done in the case at
149. 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983). One insurance carrier of the defend-
ant paid the full policy limits of $100,000 and the plaintiff agreed to exonerate that defendant
from any further liability. However, the plaintiff retained the right to pursue possible addi-
tional insurance funds from another carrier of the defendant.
150. Id. at 949 & n.3, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 474 & n.3.
151. Id. at 949-50 & n.4, 195 Cal. Rptr. 474-75 & n.4.
152. Stambaugh, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 238-39, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 848. Similarly, in Dompeling
v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc.
v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr.
259, 264 n.7 (1985), the settlement, which was held to be in good faith, provided for payment
by the settling defendant's insurance carrier of the policy limit of $100,000. The agreement
also provided for possible payment by that defendant up to $10,000 above the $100,000 on a
sliding scale depending upon plaintiff's recovery from the nonsettling defendant. Dompeling,
117 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
153. 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980), disapproved by inference, Tech-Bilt,
Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 259, 264 n.7 (1985).
154. Id. at 445, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
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bench) simply to injure another codefendant. Experience
teaches us that insurance companies usually and ordinarily pay
their policy limits only to have their insured and themselves
discharged from all liability in any given case.
1 55
This same rationale for finding a settlement for insurance policy lim-
its to be in good faith does not apply now that the supreme court has
rejected the tortious conduct test and has instead adopted the reasonable
range test. The court must now look beyond the question of tortious
conduct and determine whether the amount of the settlement is sufficient
in light of the settlor's potential liability.
There are several reasons why a court should not interpret the
supreme court's language in Tech-Bilt as a direction to find that any set-
tlement for insurance policy limits constitutes a good faith settlement
even if the amount of the insurance does not put the settlement within
the reasonable range of the settling defendant's fair share of responsibil-
ity. First, as shown by the discussion of the financial condition excep-
tion, such a result would produce inequitable results."5 6 Second, such a
rule would have the detrimental effect of rewarding a defendant with in-
adequate liability insurance. 157 For example, assume that the plaintiff
decided to pursue two tortfeasors, each with the same financial ability to
pay a judgment over and above the amount of his insurance. Defendant
A has insurance coverage of $20,000 and defendant B has insurance cov-
erage of $200,000. A result that allows the plaintiff to take the $20,000
policy from defendant A to finance his lawsuit, collect the rest of the
judgment from defendant B, have the settlement with A found to be in
good faith merely because it represented the full value of A's insurance
coverage, and thereby prevent B from claiming partial indemnity against
A would reward A for being underinsured. Thus, some of the incentive
to carry adequate liability insurance would be lost.
Several sources have commented that a rule other than one al-
lowing a policy limits payment to constitute a good faith settlement as a
matter of law would put insurance companies in a dilemma. For exam-
ple, it has been suggested that if a carrier were to pay an appropriate
policy limits demand, it might "merely be throwing its money away,"
since such a payment might be deemed not to have been made pursuant
155. Id.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
157. On the other hand, this benefit of underinsurance would be achieved only in multiple
tortfeasor cases. In a standard two-party plaintiff/defendant case, an uninsured or underin-
sured defendant would have to bear all responsibility above the amounts of his insurance pol-
icy limits alone. Therefore, this possibility may lessen any incentive to carry minimum
insurance because of the possible benefits in multi-party cases.
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to a good faith settlement. This would leave the insured defendant still
personally exposed to liability on cross-complaints for partial indemnity
in spite of the policy limits payment. On the other hand, if the carrier
did not pay the policy limits demand, it might be guilty of breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to its own insured. 158 This argu-
ment is fallacious because no additional burden or dilemma is placed on
an insurance carrier in the good faith settlement context. The insurance
company has a duty to its insured to settle for the full policy limits if that
would be necessary to protect the insured from a potentially higher ver-
dict in excess of the policy limits. 5 9 If the plaintiff accepts this amount
in settlement, then the insured is freed from additional claims by the
plaintiff, and the insurer does not face a claim for refusal to settle in bad
faith. If the insured is still liable on cross-complaints for partial indem-
nity because his insurance policy limits were not enough to constitute a
good faith settlement due to inadequate insurance coverage, then so be it.
The insurance company is in no different position than in a two party
case where its insured is the only tortfeasor and he did not carry enough
insurance to fully settle or pay plaintiff's claim.' 6I
A similar argument was made by the court in Imperial Spa, Inc. v.
Superior Court,' a case that has no force and effect because it was or-
dered depublished by the California Supreme Court. There, the court, in
158. Brief for Appellant at 20-21, Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195
Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983).
159. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976);
Johansen v. California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123
Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967). See Comment, Comparative Fault and Settlement in Joint Tortfeasor Cases: A Plea
for Principle Over Policy, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 833, 841 (1979).
160. See Comment, supra note 159, at 841-43 which predated the passage of Code of Civil
Procedure § 877.6. That Comment stated that the American Motorcycle decision created a
delicate situation for an insurance company's defense counsel because of the insurer's duty to
the insured to accept a reasonable settlement offer. The article hypothesized that if the insur-
ance company accepted a settlement offer from the plaintiff that turned out to be for less than
the insured's fair share of liability for comparative fault, the primary insurance carrier could be
found liable to the nonsettling defendant for a "bad faith" settlement because of the discrep-
ancy between the settlement and the amount of the settling defendant's fair share of relative
fault. However, this nightmare has not materialized. Now, with the pretrial determination
made available by § 877.6, the trial judge determines at the time of the settlement whether it is
in good faith. There is no cause of action by a nonsettling defendant against a settling defend-
ant for "bad faith." If the settlement was in good faith, then the settling defendant is released
from claims for partial indemnity. If the settlement was not in good faith, then the settling
defendant is not released from claims by the nonsettling defendant.
161. Imperial Spa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1185, 205 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1984)
(ordered depublished by the California Supreme Court).
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adopting the tortious conduct test and rejecting the reasonable range test,
argued that
an insurance company should be, and is, allowed to settle a
claim against its own insured by giving consideration to its in-
sured's interest to the total exclusion of the other defendant's
interest so long as in so doing it does not engage in tortious
conduct toward that second defendant. Were that rule to be
otherwise, an insurance company could be caught on the horns
of an impossible dilemma-that is between its good faith duty
to its own insured not to wrongfully refuse a settlement offer of
a plaintiff and its supposed duty to adverse concurrent tort-
feasors.
1 62
Again, this argument is incorrect because the reasonable range test and a
rule refusing to make the payment of insurance proceeds a good faith
settlement per se does not impose any new duty on an insurance company
to adverse joint tortfeasors.
However, a rule that the payment of policy limits does not automati-
cally constitute a good faith settlement may have an unpleasant effect on
an insurance company. This situation will involve the insurance com-
pany's duty to defend the insured.163 The insurance company may not
162. Id. at 1204, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
163. California cases provide without exception that an insurer owes a duty of defense to
the insured in addition to the duty to indemnify up to the limits of the insurance policy. Gray
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). Since the seminal
case of Gray, California courts have held that an insurer's duty to defend is broader than the
duty to indemnify and, in many cases, the duty to defend will arise even though there is no
duty to indemnify. Revere, Insurer's Duty to Defend, 13 PAC. L.J. 889 (1982). Further, insur-
ers are generally bound to defend against claims not covered by the policy if they are included
with claims potentially covered by the policy. Hogan v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553,
476 P.2d 825, 91 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1970). An insurer's duty to defend was further expanded
under following contract principles, by interpreting ambiguities in policy language against the
insurer and in favor of the insured. In this way, an insured's reasonable expectations of a
defense are protected and the implied in law covenant of good faith and fair dealing is pre-
served in all insurance contracts. Revere, supra, at 898. Finally, where a conflict of interest
exists between the insured and the insurer, and where the interests of the insured could be
prejudiced by the insurer's defense of a particular cause of action or claim within a suit, the
insurer is obligated to pay the fees of the insured's independent counsel who must represent the
insured as to that claim. (For example, where a policy provides no coverage for intentional
torts committed by the insured, the insurer is still obligated to defend the entire suit, including
the intentional tort claim). Previews, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026 (9th
Cir. 1981); Nike, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 578 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Executive
Aviation, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971).
Generally, an insurance carrier is liable for any judgment rendered against the insured
plus costs (even if the judgment exceeds policy limits) if the insurer refuses to settle, or refuses
to consider settlement, within the policy limits. Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50
Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). However, if an insurer fails to defend, it is responsible only
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be able to extricate itself from the litigation and from the financial conse-
quences of its duty to defend its insured by merely paying the policy
limits. If the insurance company's offer to pay the policy limits was
found to fail the test of good faith because the policy limits were too low,
the insurance company could choose to either pay the policy limits to
plaintiff anyway, even though the settlement would not be found to be in
good faith, or decline to go ahead with the settlement. In either case, the
insured would remain in the litigation because in the first situation he
would still be liable on cross-complaints for partial indemnity, and in the
second situation he would still be liable to the plaintiff. In both situa-
tions, the insurance company would still have a duty to defend the in-
sured, which is separate from any duty to pay the policy limits. In the
case of an underinsured tortfeasor, the insurance company's obligation
under its duty to defend can far exceed its monetary obligation for the
policy limits.
However, this problem cannot be blamed on the test of a good faith
settlement. It is no different than the situation in a two party case where
the defendant's insurance policy limits are insufficient settlement incen-
tive for the plaintiff. Whether an insurer can terminate its duty to defend
by simply tendering the insurance policy limits is unclear in Califor-
nia.1" The question of whether an insurer must continue to defend
claims that are proper under the substantive provisions of the policy after
the monetary limits of the policy have been reached has not been an-
swered by any California appellate decision. The out-of-state cases are
split.165 However, regardless of the eventual outcome of this issue in Cal-
for the amount of the judgment up to the policy limits and costs of defense, unless its refusal
was not in good faith. If the insurer's refusal is in bad faith, it is liable for the entire amount of
the judgment, regardless of policy limits. Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 161
Cal. Rptr. 322 (1980).
164. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters, 56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 47 (1976).
The law in California is unclear regarding the effect the exhaustion of policy limits has on
the duty of an insurer to defend, absent language in the policy specifically making such duty
coextensive with the policy limits. Although California law is unclear on this point, a recent
decision acknowledges California's policy of extending the duty of the insurer to that of pursu-
ing an appeal on behalf of the insured (where there are reasonable grounds for appeal). Cathay
Mortuary (Wah Sang), Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 582 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
165. Insurance policies prior to 1955 contained general language regarding the insurer's
duty to indemnify and defend. The insurance contracts basically provided that the insurer
would "defend any suit" brought against the insured. The courts were divided over whether
the duty to defend was solely coextensive with the policy limits. DesChamps, The Obligation
of the Insurer to Defend Under Casualty Insurance Policy Contracts, 26 INS. COUNS. J. 580
(1959); see also Annotation, Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend Action Against An Insured After
Insurer's Full Performance of its Payment Obligations Under Policy, 27 A.L.R. 3D 1057 (1969
& Supp. 1984). In 1955, the language used in insurance policies was changed by the National
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ifornia, it is not an issue unique to multi-party situations involving good
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters specifically limiting the duty to "defend any suit." Begin-
ning at that time, the language "with respect to such insurance as is provided by [the] policy,"
was added to standard liability policies. DesChamps, supra, at 582; Annotation, 27 A.L.R. 3D
at 1059. This modification to standard insurance policies was intended to clarify that the
insurer's obligation to defend was subordinate to the primary indemnification clause of the
policy and the limitations of coverage contained within. DesChamps, supra, at 583. The
courts, however, still disagreed over the insurer's duty to defend under this amended language.
In 1966, a more precise revision was incorporated into the standard policy language of some
insurers to provide that "[the insurer] shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to
defend any suit after the applicable limit of [the insurer's] liability has been exhausted by
payment of judgments or settlements." Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 597 F. Supp.
946, 948 (D.D.C. 1984). The language of the 1966 changes was deemed by some courts to
limit the insurer's duty to defend only to the policy limits in cases where full payment is made
toward judgments or settlements. The duty to defend was not terminated, however, where the
insurance company attempted to pay the policy limits into court and subsequently withdrew
from defending the insured, thereby leaving the insured to fend for himself. Id. at 953 n.7;
Conway v. Country Casualty Ins. Co., 92 Ill. 2d 388, 442 N.E.2d 245 (1982).
Courts have reached varying results regarding an insurer's duty to defend once the policy
limits have been exhausted. Some jurisdictions follow the seminal case, Lumbermen's Mut.
Casualty Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939). That case held that the insurer's
duty to defend ended with payment of the policy limits, assuming the insured's interest was not
prejudiced. In Lumbermen's, the court did not require the insurer to defend an action brought
by the father of the child for losses caused by the child's injuries, once the insurer had satisfied
a judgment against the insured to the extent of the policy limits for injuries to the child arising
out of an automobile accident.
Lumbermen's and its progeny rely principally on the idea that the insurer's primary
obligation is to pay damages and that the duty to defend is coextensive with that obligation
and ceases once the primary obligation is fulfilled. See, eg., Travelers Indem. Co. v. New
England Box Co., 102 N.H. 380, 157 A.2d 765 (1960) (holding that once the insurer had made
payments on settlements of claims to the policy limits, it was relieved of its duty to defend).
In an important case involving damages arising out of a hotel fire, the court relied on the
rationale from Lumbermen's. Denham v. La Salle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.
1948). In Denham, the court held that once the insurer had tendered the policy limits, the
insurer was not obligated to defend the insured hotel against the 250 guests' property damage
claims in excess of the policy limits. A number of courts have reached similar conclusions.
See Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 235, 194 N.E.2d 489 (1963) (in a personal injury
action where the judgments exceeded the policy limits, the insurer was not required to further
defend against claims once the payment of the policy limits had been made to other claimants).
Other courts have also found no continuing duty to defend on the part of the insurer once the
policy limits have been exhausted. See generally Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 597
F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1985) (in case involving millions of dollars of asbestos-related claims,
court found the language of the contract unambiguous and held that once the insurer had paid
the limits of its liability, it had satisfied its duty to defend under its pre-1966 policies); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Montgomery Trucking, 328 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (auto liability insurer's
duty to defend extended to limits of policy coverage, after which the obligation to defend
remaining suits fell on excess carrier and insured himself); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964) (the insurer's duty to defend terminated upon
payment of the policy limits even though additional claims remained pending); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp., 219 Ga. 6, 131 S.E.2d 534 (1963) (in multiple suits arising from one
auto accident, insured could not recover costs and attorney fees from insurer which insured
incurred after insurer had paid policy limits in settlement of some claims); National Union
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faith settlements. Therefore, the court should not adopt a rule mandat-
Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 301 A.2d 222 (D.C. 1973) (no obligation on part of pri-
mary insurer to reimburse excess insurers for expenses incurred in defense once primary in-
surer had paid its total liability under the policy limits).
Other jurisdictions do not follow Lumbermen's and instead follow the holding in Ameri-
can Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393
(1954), where the court found that absent contractual language making defense provisions
dependent upon exhaustion of specified coverage, the insurer was required to defend irrespec-
tive of its payment of the total amount of the policy limits. This line of cases stands for the
proposition that a duty to defend is separate from and/or broader than a duty to pay. The
insurer is therefore not exonerated from its duty to defend once the insurer pays the extent of
the policy limits. The courts base their holdings on several contract principles, including con-
struing ambiguous language in favor of the insured (in situations where pre-1966 policies are at
issue, or policies which do not contain the 1966 revised language), the reasonable expectations
of the insured, and the insurer's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The cases
preclude an insurer from paying the policy limits into court and abandoning the defense. See,
eg., Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949) (insurer had duty to
defend and pay expenses incurred by insured beyond policy limits, absent language in the
contract to the contrary); Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (since duty to
indemnify and defend were separate and independent, the court rejected insurer's offer to pay
full policy limits and withdraw from defense); see also National Casualty Co. v. Insurance Co.
of N. Am., 230 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Travelers Indem. Co. v. East, 240 So. 2d 277
(Miss. 1970).
Other courts have gone further than holding that the insurer cannot avoid its duty to
defend by paying the policy limits into court. These courts required the insurers to continue
defenses which were under way when the liability limits were exhausted or required the insur-
ers to defend suits brought after exhaustion of the policy limits. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 433 P.2d 795 (1967) (insurer's duty to defend insured even
though tortfeasor's policy limit had been paid to plaintiff as result of a judgment); Kosce v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 159 N.J. Super. 340, 387 A.2d 1259 (1978) (absent language in policy
clearly limiting duty to defend, primary carrier obliged to continue defending suit although it
paid policy limits as result of settlement); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft
Specialties, 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1954) (where policy limits amounted to
$300,000 maximum and 46 wrongful death claims were valued at several million dollars, ex-
haustion of policy limits would not terminate insurer's duty to continue to defend any pending
actions or any subsequent new actions); see also American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d
322 (4th Cir. 1951) (holding that insurers had to defend subsequent suit irrespective of pay-
ment of policy limits pursuant to a judgment); 7 C. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 4685 (1979 & 1986 Supp.); I LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5.12
(1986). The court in Goble Aircraft also stated that the insurer was obligated to pursue other
available post-trial remedies on behalf of the insured as well, even if that worked to the detri-
ment of the insurer. In that case, the court found that the insurance contract language was
ambiguous and therefore construed the contract terms in favor of the insured. Other jurisdic-
tions have adopted positions similar to those embraced in Goble Aircraft. See, e.g., Ursprung
v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 497 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1973) (payment of the policy limits did not
excuse insurer from its duty to defend the insured in good faith, including a duty to appeal the
adverse judgment if such an appeal were warranted); Palmer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 74 Mich.
App. 259, 254 N.W.2d 52 (1977) (duty of taking appeal from a judgment which was in excess
of the policy limits where contract language was ambiguous); Travelers Indem. Co. v. East,
240 So. 2d 277 (Miss. 1970) (insurer required to defend appeal taken from directed verdict in
favor of insureds and was liable for reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by insureds in the
appeal even though insurer had previously paid full amount of policy pursuant to other judg-
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ing that a settlement for full policy limits constitutes a good faith settle-
ment as a matter of law merely as a means to cut an insurance company's
possible losses on its duty to defend in this particular type of case.
It has been argued that a rule stating that policy limits settlements
are in good faith does not actually harm the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors. 166 The thrust of these arguments is that even if the parties
had not settled, the plaintiff would not have been likely to have collected
more than the policy limits from the settling defendant after a trial, re-
gardless of the amount and percentage of the defendant's fault. Thus,
although the policy limits might not reflect the settling defendant's fair
share of plaintiff's damages, the remaining defendants would have been
compelled to pay the shortfall whether or not the settlement had taken
place. Therefore, any lost right of the nonsettling defendants to obtain
partial indemnity against the insolvent settling defendant would be
valueless. 
67
Of course, this argument only makes sense if the settling defendant
has no assets over and above his insurance. If a settling defendant has
additional assets, the nonsettling joint tortfeasors would then be hurt by
a finding that a settlement not within the reasonable range of a settling
defendant's fair share of liability was in good faith simply because it was
for the policy limits. This was the rationale in Fuquay v. General Motors,
Corp.,161 where the court held that a policy limits settlement was in good
faith because the nonsettling joint tortfeasors could recover no more than
that amount from the settling defendant in contribution because the set-
ments rendered against insured; see also Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N.Y.S. 235, 104
N.E. 622 (1914) (holding that after electing to defend a suit, the insurer could not, after an
adverse judgment was rendered, tender the limits and cast the burden of further defense on the
insured). But cf. General Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964) (pursuant to
the express terms of the contract insurer's duty to defend insureds on appeal ceased once it
paid into the court the full amount of its policy limits plus all costs and interest).
Even where courts followed the rationale of Lumbermen's and held that the insurer's duty
to defend expired upon payment of the policy limits, most courts have implied that a different
rule would apply in certain circumstances. The insurer cannot attempt initially to pay the
policy limits and place the full burden of defense on the insured from the beginning. Nor can
an insurer abandon its defense of an insured mid-proceedings under circumstances prejudicial
to the insured. Lumbermen's, 90 N.H. at 322, 8 A.2d at 752; see also Keene Corp. v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 597 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1984); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp.,
219 Ga. 6, 131 S.E.2d 534 (1963); Conway v. Country Casualty Ins. Co., 92 Ill. 2d 388, 442
N.E.2d 245 (1982). Contra Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind.
1964).
166. Kaplin, From Contribution to Good Faith Settlements: Equity Where Are You?, 49 J.
AIR L. & COM. 771, 794 (1984); Fuquay v. General Motors Corp., 518 F. Supp. 1065, 1068
(M.D. Fla. 1981).
167. Kaplin, supra note 166, at 794.
168. 518 F. Supp. 1065 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
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tling defendant was otherwise without assets. The court concluded that,
therefore, the nonsettling co-defendant was not injured by a finding of
good faith.
169
The California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt did not address the issue
of whether a policy limits settlement should, per se, be found to be in
good faith. However, a reading of the entire opinion leads to the conclu-
sion that this should not be the rule because the amount of the insurance
policy limits is simply listed as one of many factors that should be con-
sidered in determining whether a settlement should be approved as one in
good faith.
1 70
Therefore, the most logical solution is to adopt the same approach
recommended above for relatively insolvent defendants17" ' and include in-
surance limits in the list of assets the defendant is capable of contributing
to the settlement. This conclusion is supported by the Stambaugh lan-
guage that was incorporated into the Tech-Bilt decision. 172 Quoting
Stambaugh, the Tech-Bilt court stated that a "disproportionately low set-
tlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and
uninsured, or underinsured joint tortfeasor." 173 The Stambaugh court
focused on a tortfeasor who was relatively insolvent and who lacked suffi-
cient insurance to cover his proportionate share of liability.
Several other cases dealing with insurance policy limits and good
faith settlements have examined the potential settling defendant's other
assets in addition to insurance coverage. For example in Fuquay, the
court looked to other assets of the settling defendant. 174 The court also
examined the assets above and beyond the insurance coverage in Ford
Motor Co. v. Schultz.1 75  Similarly, in Dompeling v. Superior Court, 
17 6
the settlement amount the court found to be in good faith was the policy
limits of $100,000, plus a possible additional payment by the settling
169. Id. at 1068-69.
170. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499, 698 P.2d 159, 166,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 256, 263 (1985).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
172. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
173. Id. (quoting Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 238, 132 Cal. Rptr.
843, 848 (1976) (emphasis added)).
174. Finding no other assets, the court approved the settlement. Fuquay, 518 F. Supp. at
1068-69.
175. 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 945-46, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470, 471-72 (1983).
176. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981), disapproved, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Wood-
ward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 500 n.7, 698 P.2d 159, 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264
n.7 (1985).
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defendant. 177
In summary, in determining whether a settlement amount is in good
faith, a court should not make any special exceptions from the reasonable
range test for a settlement that is for the defendant's insurance policy
limits. Rather, the amount of insurance should be but one factor in de-
termining the financial worth of the settlement defendant. The analysis
should proceed in the same manner as suggested above with respect to a
relatively insolvent joint tortfeasor. That is, a settlement should be found
to be in good faith when it equals or exceeds the amount the court deter-
mines a reasonable person with the financial condition, including insur-
ance, of the settling defendant would pay.1 78 Accompanying a court
order finding a good faith settlement should be an order as recommended
in Part 4 requiring the settling joint tortfeasor to pay to the nonsettling
joint tortfeasors the difference between the settlement amount and the
reasonable range floor.
1 79
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has offered guidance to a trial judge who is grappling
with the problem of applying the Tech-Bilt reasonable range test for a
good faith settlement to the relatively insolvent settling tortfeasor.
Under the Tech-Bilt criteria, the financial condition and insurance policy
limits of the settling defendant are relevant to the good faith of his settle-
ment. However, care must be taken not to abrogate completely the pol-
icy of equitable apportionment of fault that is a major cornerstone of the
reasonable range test. Accordingly, this Article proposes that a settling
insolvent defendant be treated the same as an insolvent who does not
settle in that after-acquired property would be subject to execution by
those who had to initially bear his insolvency shortfall.
The proposed solution involves a three-step process. First, the court
would determine the reasonable range floor, i.e., assuming the settlor
were solvent, what amount of settlement would be the lowest amount
that the court would find to be in good faith. Second, the court would
determine whether the settlement amount is what a reasonable person, in
the financial condition of the settling defendant, would pay. The insur-
ance policy limits of the settlor are treated the same as any other asset in
making this determination. If the court finds the settlement amount to
177. The additional payment was $10,000 above the $100,000 on a sliding scale. Dompel-
ing, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
178. This is the same analysis that would apply to a relatively insolvent joint tortfeasor. See
supra text accompanying notes 111-19.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 120-33.
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be reasonable, then the court would enter an order that the settlement is
in good faith. Third, in the event that a remaining defendant is forced to
pay the plaintiff an amount in excess of that remaining defendant's pro-
portionate share of damages, then the court would order that the settling
defendant remain liable to the remaining defendant for a certain amount
of the judgment paid by the remaining defendant. The amount would be
the lesser of: (a) the difference between the reasonable range floor and
the amount of the good faith settlement, i.e., the insolvency reduction;
and (b) the amount actually paid by the remaining defendant to the
plaintiff.
Under this solution, a finding of good faith would carry with it the
usual result that the nonsettling joint tortfeasors would be liable for the
entire amount of the plaintiff's judgment reduced only by the settlement.
However, while the nonsettling joint tortfeasors would initially have to
pay for the shortfall caused by the insolvency reduction, they could ulti-
mately recover this amount when and if the relatively insolvent settling
tortfeasor obtained additional assets. The remaining defendants would
not be allowed to recover any of the shortfall they paid as a result of the
settling defendant's settlement reduction.
Three purposes are accomplished by this proposal: (1) it encourages
a relatively insolvent joint tortfeasor to settle by giving him the benefit of
an early settlement; (2) it minimizes the corresponding harm to the non-
settling joint tortfeasors; and (3) it provides a workable solution for the
trial judge.
